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ABSTRACT
The problem o£ cost growth o£ major systems acquisitions
has long been an important concern within the Department o£
Defense (DOD) and Congress. A brief review of acquisition
history from the 40 's to the present shows little success in
controlling it. With so many unsuccessful past changes to
the organization and processes, the cost growth problem begs
for a new approach. A review of the static principles of
organizational design reveals several inconsistencies when
compared to the DOD structure. The science of organizational
development (OD) is discussed and recommended as a solution.
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The purpose of this research is to convince the reader
to consider, to support, and to help create a major change
within the acquisition process in order to eliminate exces-
sive cost growth. The research has revealed some startling
conclusions about the management techniques employed within
DOD. Only through publication and dissemination of a docu-
ment such as this thesis can a DOD community understanding
of the cost growth problem be achieved. It is anticipated
that this thesis will stimulate a desire for a community-
wide, planned change, managed from the top, for a long-term
solution to the cost growth problem. This solution is achiev-
able by implementing successful behavioral science skills
developed and utilized by other successful bureaucracies.
A, OBJECTIVE OF RESEARCH
The objective of this research is to examine the problem
of cost growth from a common sense viewpoint in order to
develop a realistic solution to the DOD-wide problem.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The questions underpinning the research are:
What are the causes of cost growth?
What management techniques have been successful in the
past in controlling cost growth?
What are successful management techniques?
11

What can be done today; what tools/techniques are
available to control cost growth?
C. METHODOLOGY
To accomplish the objective and answer the above four
questions, a review of: (1) the acquisition process for
major weapon systems, (2) the history of attempted solutions,
(3) successful management techniques, and (4) organizational
development is presented.
The causes of cost growth are extracted from existing
literature but are rearranged and categorized according to
responsible groups (i.e., Congress, the DOD structure, pro-
gram management, contractor, etc.).
Finally, conclusions and recommendations are presented.
Most of the recommendations evolve from other successful
bureaucracies
.
D. INTERPRETATION OF COST GROWTH
1
. Definition
Cost growth refers to the net change of current
estimates over a base figure previously established [Ref. 1:
2-25]
.
2. Origin of the Term "Cost Growth"
Prior to 1969, the term "cost growth" did not actu-
ally exist. More often the term for something costing more
than planned was "cost overrun." The term cost overrun was
used by the public, media, and Defense critics in a very broad
12

sense which often led to misunderstanding and confusion. Thus,
in 1969, an ad hoc conunittee established by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) recommended using the term "cost
growth" to "supplant the term 'cost overrun' to describe
total cost increases in defense programs" [Ref. 2: 94].
3 . Methods of Measurement
Past studies and research by the Rand Corporation,
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) , the Institute for
Defense Analysis (IDS) and other team or individual reports
normally approach cost growth from the Selected Acquisition
Report (SAR)
,
DODI 7000.3, vieivpoint when discussing causes.
Additionally, these reports use graphs and charts to indicate
the various cost changes in programs which are grouped indi-
vidually, en masse, or by program category, with time being
the bottom axis (abscissa)
.
The Rand Corporation has employed a cost ratio of
current estimate costs to development estimate costs (CE/DE)
to express cost growth.
The method employed in Chapter V to discuss cost
growth diverts from traditional numerical approaches and
instead evaluates a program's management from a macroscopic
view.
a. Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) Categories
The categorical causes of cost growth tradition-




According to the April 1979 revision of DOD
Instruction 7000.3, Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) , the
variance categories measured at DSARC II are
:
Economic Change: Solely owing to inflation rates
different from those originally predicted.
Quantity Change: Variation due to buying different
quantities than originally planned.
Schedule Change: The cost effects of revisions in
delivery schedules of hardware or documentation or
in completion dates of tests. (This category includes
such cases as terminating and perhaps rehiring and
retraining workers.)
Engineering Change: Cost variation due to alteration
of physical item and/or functional characteristics of
the major equipment item.
Estimating Change: Variation due to correction of
estimating errors in the baseline cost projection or
adjustment for assumption not provided for in engineer-
ing, schedule, or support variance categories.
Support Change: Cost variation due to training and
training equipment, initial spares, manuals, etc.
Cost Overrun/Underrun : These are costs fully attributed
to the performance of contractors.
Other: Reasons not covered in other categories.
E. PRESENT STATUS OF COST GROWTH
It is not uncommon today to pick up any newspaper or
magazine and find an article about Defense mismanagement.
For example, mentioned in a 14 February 1985 issue of Time
Magazine was the following: "Outside critics have long
accused the military services of misleading, inefficient
practices that cause huge cost overruns and long delays in
the delivery of weapons."
14

On television, both CBS's "60 Minutes" and ABC's
"20/20" have aired a gamut of cost growth and Defense
mismanagement pieces.
Repetition of the plethora of media attention is not
necessary here. It is necessary for the reader to continue
review of this document to learn the causes of cost growth.
It is sufficient to suggest that the present situation
facing DOD in relation to this topic is :
- it has been researched to death with no effective
solutions
;
- it occurs year after year, decade after decade;
- a realistic solution has not evolved;
- it is receiving more public attention, and
- the growth numbers seem to become worse and worse.
To provide the reader with a numerical base for cost
growth, a summary of the 46 SAR programs as reported by
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Considering the methods o£ reporting, assumptions, and other
allowances, this cost growth could easily be much worse.
For those not familiar with the major weapon system
acquisition process. Chapter II is a review of the process.
Those who are familiar with the major weapon system acquisi-
tion process should go to Chapter III for a discussion of
the history of attempted solutions which provides insight
to the cost growth problem.
16

II. THE ACQUISITION PROCESS FOR
MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a basic know-
ledge of the present acquisition process for major weapons
systems to assist the reader in the interpretation of the
history of cost growth presented in Chapter III and, more
importantly, the causes of cost growth presented in Chapter V.
This chapter will highlight the important elements and areas
of consideration for the acquisition of a major weapon system.
Major system acquisition for the three services is governed
by Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5000.1.
A. A SYSTEM'S LIFE CYCLE
DODD 5000.1 defines four distinct phases of the acquisi-
tion process, phases 0, I, II and III. Two other phases
are often considered in discussions of the life cycle, a
pre-phase period and a period for phase-out. The researcher
will briefly discuss these phases also.
It is not necessary for every system to move through
each phase one by one, nor is it unusual for a system develop-
ment to begin at any of the phases prior to or at phase III.
Figure 1 presents the first five phases of the life cycle
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Figure 1. Summary Overview of the Acquisition Process
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1. Pre-phase 0: On-going Mission Analysis
The starting point for a major system originates
in many sources. The need may arise from a perceived or
changed threat, from obsolescence of existing systems, or
from a technological or cost reduction opportunity. Ideally
the mission need would originate from a situational summary,
a document which discusses weaknesses of an operational plan
as experienced during trial maneuvers or exercises of a
Unified or Specified Command.
2
.
Phase 0: Concept Exploration
It is during this phase that the program manager is
assigned, and several alternative concepts or methods to
accomplish the mission are considered. At the end of this
phase. Milestone I, a decision is made by the reviewing
committees/groups to select the alternative or to request
further development in the ensuing phase. Alternative con-
cepts for achieving the mission need may be solicited from
R§D laboratories, universities, or industry.
3. Phase I: Demonstration and Validation
This is a key phase as it verifies the ability of
the design to meet mission needs. During this phase, the
alternatives selected from phase are to be demonstrated,
either by analysis or actual prototype design in order to
verify the capability/availability/credibility of the critical
aspects of the system design. Prior to the next phase.
19

decisions are made to select the best alternative for further
development.
4. Phase II: Full-scale Development
Full-scale development is considered to include three
sub-phases for completing the design and verifying its
effectiveness through testing. The sub-phases are detail
engineering, prototyping and a pilot production sub-phase.
This phase is important for several reasons. During this
phase, a production contractor is selected and the second
source, if high-volume production is planned, is selected.
Prior to selecting a second source, the strategy for second
sourcing must be firmly developed as requirements (data,
etc.) for the second source must be obtained through previous
contracting. In this phase, prior testing culminates with
the signing of approval for service use (ASU) prior to pro-
ceeding to the next phase. (ASU may soon not be required.)
5
.
Phase III: Production and Deployment
This is the most costly of all the phases. During
production and deployment, the system is assembled in accord-
ance with previously developed documentation and put into
use by the particular service. For high-volume production,
second sourcing, in accordance with the previously designed
strategy, is normally used during this phase. For low-volume
production, where the systems are highly sophisticated, it
may be desirable to second source subsystems or components.
20

During production, it is necessary to closely monitor the
quality assurance o£ the system through testing.
6. Phase-out: Program Office and System
This phase considers both the system/equipment
phase-out and program office phase-out. During the program
office phase-out, a historical account of significant events,
lessons learned, important people, associated companies, and
research centers should be documented. During equipment
phase-out, supply support and training programs should be
terminated. Facilities dedicated to the phased-out system
should be recommended for other use.
7. Costs During the Life Cycle
Planning the tota- life cycle cost of a system
must be considered on an equal basis with performance, time,
and logistic element requirements. Planning future cost
considerations of producibility , manpower requirements,
maintainability and reliability into the design can mitigate
exorbitant costs during the final phases of the life cycle.
Figure 2 presents typical percentages of the total expendi-
tures during each phase. Significant impact on lowering
future costs is obtained by effective decision making in
the early phases.
B. REVIEW HIERARCHY FOR EACH PHASE
Each of the services contains its own hierarchy of
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Figure 2. System Life Cycle Cost.
review hierarchies of each service are presented in Figure 3,
The importance of this subsection of the thesis is to demon-
strate that, prior to continuation of each ensuing phase,
each hierarchical level must be satisfied. Without the
acceptance of the hierarchical level, system development can
not continue.
C. SALIENT DOCUMENTATION FOR EACH PHASE
This section explains the important documents that the
above hierarchical levels evaluate during their review.
Before each phase continues, there are several documents
which must be approved at Milestone decision points. These
milestones correspond to the beginning date of each phase,
























Figure 3. Reviews for Each Service and Milestone
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at Milestone 1 is the system concept paper (SCP) . Milestones
II and III require a decision coordinating paper (DCP)
.
To begin a system. Milestone 0, the program needs only
to become part of the program objectives memorandum (POM).
These documents are reviewed by the SECDEF at which time
a go-ahead is issued via Mission Needs Determination (MND)
.
The integrated program summary (IPS) and the functional
implementation plan (FIP) are also reviewed by the
Secretary of Defense. The IPS is limited to 30 pages and




program alternatives, cost and cost track summary,
procurement quantities, test and evaluation plans/summary,
and the organizational and operational concept.
The FIP primarily discusses the method for implementation
of the acquisition strategy: skipping phases, competition,
second sourcing, sole source, proposed follow-on contracts,
use of pre-planned product improvement (P^I) and industrial
modification improvement program (IMIP)
.
Other documents which are updated throughout phases 0,
I, and II are the test and evaluation master plan (TEMP),
the integrated logistics support plan (ILSP)
,
the life cycle
cost (LCC) estimates, and the equipment/system specifications




D. ELEMENTS OF LOGISTICS
Understanding the nine logistics elements is a key to
understanding the diverse subjects o£ the acquisition of any
system. DODD 5000.1 states:
Logistic supportability shall be a design requirement
as important as cost, schedule, and performance. A
continuous interface between the program management
office and the manpower and logistics communities shall
be maintained throughout the acquisition process.





The maintenance plan is the lead element because
it promulgates the concept of maintaining the system. It
is a focus for designing the system. For example, technical
manuals must be written in consonance with the level of
repair as stated in the maintenance plans and training
schedules for maintenance personnel must be coordinated to
ensure that the correct number of personnel with the required
skills is available when the system enters the field/fleet.
Other considerations include preventive and corrective
maintenance skills and schedules.
2 Manpower and Personnel
Planning for the skill levels required for repair,
operation, and installation as well as planning the required
amounts of these personnel is necessary for the smooth,
integrated operation of a complex system. For some DOD
27

systems today, manpower accounts for approximately 50%
of the annual operating costs. Thus it is imperative to




Ensuring that repair supplies/parts are in the right
place at the right time is the function of supply support.
This element receives direction for development from the
level of repair and type of repair (depot, intermediate,
etc.) established in the maintenance plan.
4. Technical Data
This multi-faceted logistic element is one of the
most difficult to manage. Technical data includes drawings
(many different types and qualities), technical manuals,
configuration management documentation, training manuals,
repair and operating manuals. Configuration management is
the most difficult to manage because of the ever-changing
design and suppliers of parts.
5 Transportation and Handling
Transportation and handling must consider transport-
ing vehicles, the packaging, and storage requirements. The
size of the system or its components or restriction of size
because of vehicle size limitations and the transportation




6. Support and Test Equipment
Naturally test equipment must be designed to the
level of repair of the system. In many cases, special test
equipment must be newly designed. In other cases, the
maintenance plan may specify designing in order to utilize
general -purpose test equipment. Schedules for preventive




Training and Training Devices
The complex weapons of today more than ever require
in-depth training and special training devices. To prepare
personnel for operating such complex weapons systems,
simulators, special courses, and unique training programs
must be planned for and established. In some cases,
training to operate special test equipment or to instruct
personnel on repair procedures must be established. Train-
ing courses will have to consider the amount of operating
personnel/manpower requirements. (Manpower requirement
will have to consider the number of training instructors.)
8 Facilities
A variety of facilities is required for storage,
testing, training, and operational shelters for the different
types of weapons systems procured which may include aircraft
hangars, submarine docks or transportable shelters. The
maintenance (painting, cleaning, etc.) for these facilities
must also be predetermined.
29

9 . Computer Resources Support
Emphasis on software at the inception of a weapon
system is as important as any of the other logistic elements.
Software should be designed to facilitate efficient change
(even at the expense of technical design efficiency) and
should consider factors which reduce life cycle cost.
These factors are selection of the language, designs of
the system, inter-system and intra-system interfaces. Com-
puter resources and management are thoroughly discussed in
MIL-STD-1679.
E. MANAGEMENT CONTROLS
DOD Directive 7000.1 is the resource management system
(RMS) which is designed to integrate DOD financial management
with other DOD management systems for acquisition, inventory,
and operations. This relationship is depicted in Figure 4.
This section discusses several performance measurement sub-
systems of the selected acquisitions information and manage-
ment system (SAIMS) as presented in Figure 5. The program,
planning, and budgeting concerns of management are discussed
in Section G of this chapter.
1. Cost/Schedule Control System Criteria (C/S CSC)
C/S CSC, as specified by DODI 7000.2, is used to
evaluate the effectiveness of the contractor's internal
systems. The C/S CSC does not require any data to be
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to data needed to evaluate the system and monitor its
operation during the life of the contract. Specifically
the contractor's internal systems must provide:
a. Budgeted cost for work scheduled
b. Budget cost for work performed
c. Actual cost of work performed
d. Estimated cost of completion
e. Budget cost at completion
f. Cost and schedule variances -explanations
g. Traceability.
2 . Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR)
DODI 7000.3 is the controlling document that sets
forth the Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) Program, The
SAR is the standard, comprehensive summary status report on
major defense acquisition programs. This report reflects
the program manager's current best estimate of performance,
schedule, and cost goals and compares these estimates with
baseline estimates established at DSARC Milestone II when
the program was approved for full-scale development. The
SAR is not designed to be a decision document but rather a
standardized information reporting document. It is com-
pleted on a quarterly basis and forwarded to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense which transmits these reports to the
General Accounting Office and to the Congress.
SAR coverage is normally limited to those weapon
system acquisition programs that are expected to experience
33

total cumulative financing for research, development, test
and evaluation of over $200 million or cumulative production
investment in excess of $ 1 billion. (SAR coverage may
also be directed by the Secretary of Defense for programs
of major interest regardless of expected financing
requirement.)
The SAR's are formatted to address the following
areas [Ref . 4: 2-2-2-27] :
(1) References - display most of the programmatic in-
formation on the weapon system and include system
description and mission.
(2) Summary - briefly states the significant develop-
ment from program inception and focuses on major events
and changes since last report.
(3) Operational /Technical Characteristics - list the
quantifiable design goals and report demonstrated per-
formance so far accomplished.
(4) Schedule Milestones - provide information concern-
ing key program milestones encompassing the entire
period from program initiation to award of first
full-scale production contract.
(5) Program Acquisition Cost - summarizes all changes
to both costs and quantities which have occurred since
establishment of the program baseline.
(6) Contractor Cost - reports contractor cost information
on all active prime and associate prime contracts valued
in excess of $5 million.
(7) Variance Analysis - summarizes the reasons for
changes from the baseline values.
(8) Budget Year and Out -Year Programs - provide a
breakdown by fiscal year ot program acquisition cost
and escalation applicable to the "Budget Year" and
"Balance to Complete" segments of the current estimate.
34

(9) Cost Quantity Curves - provide for recurring unit
flyaway cost-quantity constant dollars.
The SAR provides analysts and researchers with a very useful
tool. This document, referenced to an approved baseline,
provides a comprehensive and continuous record of changes
throughout a program evolution.
3. Cost Performance Reports (CPR)
CPR's, as specified by DODI 7000.8, are the vehicle
which actually provides cost and schedule performance infor-
mation to the DOD project office from the contractor. The
CPR is a monthly report of contractual progress with identi-
fication of significant problems obtained through analysis
of variances of previously prepared plans. It was reported
by a defense analyst that DODI 7000.8 is seldom utilized
as its efficacy is considered minimal and program managers




Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)
The WBS subdivides a total program into its compo-
nent elements. It displays and defines the hardware elements
or systems to be produced or developed. It utilizes an
indenture level process to further subdivide components
of a system into even smaller elements or systems. For
management purposes, this indenture process may continue to
three or four levels of hardware. These indenture levels
should be directly related to the elements of C/S CSC and
to the management organizational structure. This
35

relationship is presented in Figure 6. MIL-STD-881 describes
the WBS , and deviation from MIL-STD-881 must be discussed in
the IPS.
F. SOURCE SELECTION AND CONTRACTING
1. Source Selection
Contracting for a specific phase or several phases
may occur depending on the acquisition strategy. In either
case, the contracting process of a particular supplier,
from source selection to negotiation of the final contract,
will be similar to the following process.
The Department of Commerce publishes a synopsis
of the contractual effort in the Commerce Business Daily
(CBD) . A number of large firms may respond to the CBD
synopsis with expressions of interest. However, before
the firm receives a request for proposal (from the procuring
agency) , it must be judged technically and managerially
competent. The request for proposal includes further
details about solutions or approaches desired, anticipated
problems, and any other information which might be helpful
in the development of a response (i.e., type of contract,
etc.). The firm then provides a proposal to the procuring
agency which is reviewed by an evaluation team.
The evaluation team is composed of several indi-
viduals or groups who represent areas of expertise essential
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Typical evaluation criteria that the evaluation
team includes (but is not limited to) are technical and
production capability, past experience, management, the
proposed technical approach or concept, and estimated costs.
Weighing factors are applied to the criteria in order to
obtain an overall ability level of the firm.
Finally, a contractor/firm is selected and the
final contract is negotiated.
2. Contract Types
There are basically two types of contracts which
a program manager may employ: fixed price contracts and
cost-type contracts.
The fixed price contract maximizes the possible
profit which a contractor (producer) can earn but also
maximizes his risk. From the buyer's point of view, this
type of contract offers low risk and minimum administrative
requirements and motivates the contractor to produce
efficiently [Ref. 5: 117].
On the other hand, cost-type contracts are used when
it is impossible or unfair to arrange fixed price contracts.
Here the buyer assumes the financial risk and the contractor
agrees only to give his best efforts to complete the contract
within the estimated cost provided in the contract. With
cost-type contracts, however, the contractor is under no
further obligation if, despite his efforts, the material
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or service contracted for is not fully provided at the time
he expends all the funds in the contracts [Ref. 3: 3-36].
a. Acquisition Phases and Contract Types
Fixed price contracts are recommended during the
concept exploration phase (DSARC Phase 0) because the product
[a paper report) is clearly established and because this type
of contract provides the only means of placing competing
contractors on an equal footing. However, the contract
dollar amount for Phase should be sufficient to pay for
the work requested lest contractors spend their own funds
in an attempt to "buy in."
Fixed cost contracts are also recommended
for the Demonstration and Validation Phase (Phase I) for
the same reasons as those presented for Phase 0. The argu-
ment is that, even though potential uncertainties (and
therefore risks) are greater, equally funded competition
overrides such risk.
During the full-scale development phase (Phase
II), it is recommended that a cost-type contract be used.
The justification offered is that the government must
have the flexibility to make decisions with regard to tech-
nical uncertainties so as to achieve the best cost-performance
schedule compromises. The expected costs of corrections
brought about by these technical uncertainties are always
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fuzzy at the outset o£ Phase II and, correctly, a portion
of the risk should be borne by the government.
Once the full development phase is completed
and the design is firmly established, a fixed cost type is
in order.
b. Fixed Price Contract Types
Types of fixed cost contracts include:
Firm Fixed Price (FFP) - The Buyer agrees to pay a
specified price to the seller when the latter delivers
what has been purchased.
Fixed Price with Escalation (FPE) - An FFP type contract
except an escalation clause provides for either an upward
or downward change in price as a result of changes in
either material prices or labor rates relative to an
economic index.
Fixed Price with Redetermination (FPR) - A contract
wherein the amounts of labor and material are initially
unknown but can be determined with limited production.
A buyer contracts for a temporary price he believes
to be high but receives protection from still higher
prices . After an agreed-upon percentage of work has
been completed at the temporary price, the contract
price is redetermined based upon data from production
to date. The buyer expects the redetermined price to be
lower (perhaps because of learning or expected future
volume)
.
Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) - The FPI is a variation of
a redeterminable type contract designed to incentivize
production efficiency via a target price, a ceiling
price and variable profit formula [Ref. 5: 117-118].
2 . Cost-Type Contract Types
A listing of cost-type contracts includes:
Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) - This type is a varia-
tion of an FPI type contract where buyer and seller
agree agree beforehand on a tentative fee based on
estimated cost. If the seller can reduce costs below





Regardless, all costs are paid
Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) - This type is an offshoot
of a CPIF contract wherein the fee consists of two
parts : a fixed amount which does not vary with con-
tract performance and an award amount intended to be
sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in
contract performance in areas such as quality, time-
liness, ingenuity and cost effectiveness.
Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) - A contract type that pro-
vides the seller with reimbursement for all allowable
costs up to a stated amount plus a fixed fee calculated
as a percentage of the originally estimated cost [Ref. 5:
120-121]
.
d. Risk as a Function of Contract Type
By way of summary, Figure 7 depicts the relative
risk assumed by the government and the contractor as a func-









Figure 7. Degree of Risk as a Function of Contract Type
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G. PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING SYSTEM
1 . Federal Budget Process
Before presenting the Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System (PPBS) , the more general budget process
will be briefly addressed. The purpose of the federal
budget process is to allocate scarce national resources
among competing public demands [Ref. 6: A-3] . Figure 8
depicts the main three phases of the process: (1) Executive
Formulation, (2) Congressional Enactment, and (3) Budget
Execution. In the Defense Department, Executive Formulation
is carried out in a PPBS context.
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Figure 8. Phases of the Federal Budget Process
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It is important to recognize that each of these
main phases interrelates and overlaps. For example, a
Defense Department program manager would have been concur-
rently involved in executing (spending) the Fiscal Year (FY)
1979 budget appropriations, testifying before Congress in
support of the FY 1980 budget enactment, and planning for
the FY 1981 budget. All this would have been transpiring
during the month of February, 1979.
Note also that within each budget cycle there is a
two-year time delay from the initiation of budget planning
until the beginning of the execution phase.
2. PPBS Concepts
McKinney and Howard state that PPBS provides a method
or approach whereby "objectives and resources and their
interrelations are taken into account to achieve a coherent
whole. Three major concepts underlie PPBS" [Ref. 7: 3267].
Development in [an] emergency of an analytical capability
to examine in depth both agency objectives and the vari-
ous programs to meet the objectives;
Formulation of a multi-year (at least five years) plan-
ning and programming process coupled with a sophisticated
management information system; and
Creation of an improved budgetary mechanism that can
facilitate broad program decisions, translate them into
more refined decisions in a budgetary context, and then
present the results for executive and legislative action.
The PPBS approach is premised on questions such
as the following:
What are the basic goals and objectives being sought?
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What are the alternative means for achieving the stated
goals and objectives?
What are the comprehensive costs (present, future, and
full) of each alternative, both in financial and non-
financial terms?
What are the benefits to be achieved from each alter-
native and how effective will each be in achieving the
stated goals and objectives?
3. Department of Defense PPBS Process
In keeping with concepts discussed above, the
Department of Defense instituted PPBS in the early 1960 's.
The goal was to facilitate budgeting in terms of forces and
systems rather than resource categories [Ref. 8: 71]. The
progression is from general articulation of national mili-
tary strategy and objectives to specific programs, organi-
zations and forces necessary to carry out the strategy and
objectives
.
A model for viewing the Department of Defense PPBS
is provided in Figure 9 [Ref. 9: 7].
The planning phase of PPBS is initiated with sub-
mission of the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) and
ends with issuance of the Consolidated Guidance.
The JSPD provides the views of the uniformed military
Joint Chief of Staff on policy objectives, national military
strategy, and force levels. The JSPD is not fiscally con-
strained and is based on short-, mid-, and long-range
intelligence studies. This document is published in early
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The Consolidated Guidance is prepared for the
Secretary of Defense by the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Program Analysis and Evaluation) with inputs from through-
out the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Consolidated
Guidance contains a statement of fundamental policy and
rationale underlying the defense program. Programming and
fiscal guidance are also included to provide the services
with the information needed to develop their programs.
After a draft is discussed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and with the Service Secretaries, a revised Consolidated
Guidance is released to the Services in March.
The Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) is the
programming link or bridge between planning and budgeting.
It is here, in the programming phase of PPBS , where a program
gains approval for development by standing up to competition
against alternative means of accomplishing the same purpose
and alternative uses of the same resources.
The POM is a definite statement on how the service
intends to carry out its responsibilities with respect to
the national strategy. The "how" is constrained by the
fiscal guidance in the consolidated guidance.
The POM is transmitted to the Secretary of Defense
via the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs review the
POM'S (one is prepared by each service) and write the Joint
Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM) . This memorandum is
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the Joint Chiefs' of Staff view on the risk associated with
the POM. (Remember that the POM is fiscally constrained
whereas the JSPD was not.)
After the POM and the JPAM are received, the Secretary
of Defense reviews the memoranda and identifies alternatives
for those issues where the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the Service differ. After the Joint Chiefs and the
services have an opportunity to reclama, the Secretary of
Defense issues the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) . The
PDM is the Secretary of Defense's decisions on acquisition
programs, force levels, and levels of support. The issuance
of this PDM is the end of the programming phase of PPBS.
Upon receipt of the PDM, the service prepared firm
budget estimates of the cost of the programs approved in
the PDM. These budget estimates are sent directly to the
Office of the Secretary of Defense for further analysis.
The Secretary of Defense holds budget hearings
with the Services, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of
Management and Budget. Following these hearings, the
Secretary formulates his budget decisions. These budget
decisions are then submitted for incorporation in the
President's budget which is submitted to the Congress.
4 . Five-Year Defense Plan
The Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP) is an official
Office of the Secretary of Defense publication which
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summarizes the approved plans and programs of the Department
of Defense components. More simply stated, it is the manage-
ment information system (database) that supports the PPBS
.
The FYDP records, summarizes and sisplays budget decisions
that have been approved by the Secretary of Defense. The
FYDP is structured as modeled in Figure 10 [Ref. 6: A-8]
.
This structure allows different aggregations of data
that would be meaningful to different managers. For example,
a researcher or analyst seeking information in research and
development budgets would query this PPBS database by defining
the year of interest and (X, Y, Z) coordinates. He would find
the needed information under: (RDT^E appropriations, general
purpose forces, planes or whatever).
The FYDP is updated in October, after Congressional
action on the appropriations bill, in January after the


















III. HISTORY OF ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS
This chapter is a historical discussion o£ cost growth,
highlighting past attempts to manage it. This historical
evolution is an integral part of this thesis as it supports
the final conclusion that the past attempted solutions to
cost growth have focused on the wrong problems and have
used an ineffective approach . The following discussion is
presented in chronological order by decade.
A. THE 1940'S
In the 1940 's, the Hoover Commission was established to
examine the DOD acquisition process. Its recommendation
urged that budgets submitted to Congress reveal the purpose
for which requested funds were needed. The acquisition pro-
cess at this time was a function of each of the service's
own methods of procurement. The first policy for unification
was presented July 26, 1947, when President Truman signed
the National Security Act, creating the Department of Defense.
An orderly and integrated planning, programming and budgeting
system such as the one used today was not manifest in the
40's or 50's. However, in 1949, James V. Forrestal, appointed
as the first Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) , created a uniform
budget structure but left planning and budgeting to the dis-
cretion of each service [Ref. 10: 15].
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B. THE 1950 'S
In the early 1950 's, the concept o£ program management
was promulgated through the Air Force's popular "375 Series,"
which originated for the missile space programs and where
failure could not be tolerated. With the rapidly advancing
technology,
...money was authorized to develop almost any new defense
system that appeared capable of giving the United States
a performance advantage over any potential adversary
[Ref. 10: 9].
Additionally, it was President Eisenhower's policy to replace
a reduction of forces with modern arms [Ref. 11: 200].
The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 sought
to carry out the Hoover Commission recommendation by requiring
an executive budget based on governmental functions and activi
ties. The problem with this legislation was that"... the
terms 'program,' 'performance,' 'activity,' and 'function'
are all used more or less interchangeably" [Ref. 12: 34].
The famous Peck and Scherer of the Harvard University Graduate
School of Business analyzed twelve typical weapons systems
programs of the 1950 's in which "the average cost growth was
found to be 220 percent beyond the original target cost"
[Ref. 13: 5]. Most contracts during this period were cost
reimbursement for development and production. Engineering
design was not a major consideration for, when a design
encountered problems in production or in the field, it was
modified via government -funded engineering changes.
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In the late fifties, consideration of should-cost, design-
to-cost, and life cycle costs emerged. The government, from
Congress to procuring agencies, began closer scrutinization
of Defense contractors. The reason for this scrutinization
was due to the high risks and costs associated with some
programs, especially the ballistic programs, most of which
were sole source contracts.
C. THE 1960'S
Throughout most of the 1960 's, the Secretary of Defense
was Robert S. McNamara (the whiz kid of Ford), who served
under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. McNamara was respon-
sible for centralizing authority and planning for DOD at the
OSD level through the five-year defense programs, originally
known as the Five-Year Force Structure on Financial Plans.
In 1962, the Harvard Weapons Acquisition Project Report
on 12 major defense systems showed that costs were averaging
as much as seven times more than originally estimated. In
1965, as ASD(C) , Dr. Robert N. Anthony developed the Resource
Management System (RMS) as a tool to bring the accountability
feature into the PPBS . The Systems Acquisition Information
and Management Systems (SAIMS) , which included SARS , Cost
Performance Reports (CPR) , and Cost/Schedule Control System
Criteria (C/S CSD) , came into existence. These relationships
are shown in Figure 11. Systems analysis, life -cycle-costing
(LCC) , should-cost analysis, and total package procurement
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Figure 11. Relationship of SAIMS to RMS.
were promoted during this period. During the 1960's, hard-
ware competition in the development phase was rare "because
o£ the Advanced Prototype Program which provided dollar incen-
tives for the Services to opt for an acquisition strategy
involving competition" [Ref. 8: VI].
In 1968, SECDEF began the annual issue of logistic guidance
and 18 other guidance memoranda, some of which included:
- development of integrated logistics support plans,
- proposal evaluation and source selection,
- defense standardization programs,
- quality assurance programs,




- technical data management,
- configuration management, and
- work breakdown structuring.
At the end o£ the 1960 's, President Richard M. Nixon appointed
Melvin R. Laird as SECDEF and David Packard as DSECDEF, and
with them began a new decade of changes to the acquisition
process and organizational design.
D. THE 1970'S
The 1970 's started with the 10 Packard initiatives
presented in Figure 12 which were soon codified in the formal
policy documents, particularly in Department of Defense
Directive 5000.1, Major Systems Acquisitions, and a series
of supporting DOD directives and instructions issued soon
afterward [Ref . 14: 2]
.
Apart from inflation and changes in quantity, the
major drivers of cost growth for the programs of the
1970 's were schedule changes, engineering changes, and
estimating errors [Ref. 14: VIII].
A Rand report, indicates that the seventies were much
more successful in controlling cost growth than the sixties
[Ref. 5]
.
Under Packard, OSD assumed the role of monitor and
decision maker at xMilestones I, II, and III for major systems
only at DSARC ' s . Concerning cost growth, Packard engaged
in discussion with the Industry Advisory Council, a cross
-
section of industry representatives and discovered many

FIGURE 12.
THE PACKARD INITIATIVES: MAJOR POLICY ELEMENTS
1. Provide for systematic program reviews at important
decision milestones by a group of senior officials in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (establish the
DSARC--the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council).
2. Improve program cost estimates and provide OSD with an
independent source of such estimates by estimating a
Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) within OSD.
3. Design to cost: establish a cost goal as one of the
primary program objectives, equal to schedule and per-
formance in importance; design with operation and
support costs in mind as well as production costs
(life cycle costing)
.
4. Increase testing objectivity by establishing agencies
for operational test and evaluation (OT§E) independent
of the Service commands responsible for development of
new systems
.
5. Improve the training of program managers by establish-
ing military training courses and schools to prepare
them for the job.
6. Improve training of program mamagers by establishing
military training courses and schools to prepare them
for the job.
7. Attract superior officers to program mamagement, in
part by providing them with superior promotion oppor-
tunieis
.
8. Reduce the turnover rate of program managers so that
they have longer job tenure.
9. Resolve technological uncertainties during development,
not during production (hence emphasize earlier and more
complete hardware testing and reduce "concurrency'*--the




problems he later attempted to solve. Packard discontinued
use of the total package procurement, developed in the 60 's,
and created the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG)
before he left office in 1972. In December 1972, the
Commission on Government Procurement presented 149 recom-
mendations, 82 of which required executive action and 67
of which required legislative action by the Congress [Ref. 6]
During this era, DOD considered design-to-cost and life
cycle cost (LCC) as important in the acquisition strategy
because dollars spent prior to production could save sig-
nificant after-production, operation and support dollars.
In 1976, the National Security Industrial Association
(NSIA) determined that LCC could not become a quantitative
consideration until more emphasis was placed on mean-time-
between-fallures , unit price, and required operation and
maintenance personnel. Other items reported by NSIA included
problems such as excessive requirements, underestimating,
over-optimism, unrealistic costs and schedules, buying-in,
over-control of industry and change orders. As a result,
ASD William P. Clements required 59 program managers to
report their status to him directly on a monthly basis. This
action helped create some constructive actions within the
overall acquisition process; however, when Clements left in
1977, this reporting procedure was discontinued [Ref. 10: 48]
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In 1975, Clements established the Acquisition Advisory
Group to examine and access the Army, Navy/Marine Corps
and Air Force recommendations concerning management o£
defense systems acquisition at the OSD level. Many recom-
mendations were made and several were enacted. In 1976,
the Office of Management and Budget (0MB) issued 0MB
Circular A-109, which was patterned after DOD directives of
the 5000 series. Also in 1976, Zero Base Budgeting was
enacted and a four-step source selection process was enacted
through a revision of DOD Directive 4105.62 (Selection of
Contractural Sources for Major Defense Systems)
.
By this time, so many DOD policies, directives, and
instructions proliferated that the Aerospace Industries
Association (AIA) published a list of desirable character-
istics of government documents to assist in the review of
the plethora of regulations, shown in Figure 13.
Figure 14 is a presentation of the numerous studies
and revisions to existing documents of the weapons systems
acquisition process which were completed this decade.
E. THE 1980'S
The 1980 's began with the coining of a new term for
evaluating weapons systems --'•affordability"--which soon
lost its momentum [Ref . 15]
.
Five working committees , chartered by Deputy Secretary




DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
Government documents should:
1. Recognize that no two programs are identical.
2. Recognize that good management depends primarily upon the judg-
ment of competent people having appropriate authority.
3. Contain realistic objectives.
4. Recognize that risk is an inherent part of the defense system
development effort.
5. Motivate government/industry personnel to achieve overall pro-
gram objectives.
6. Permit contractor management flexibility.
7. Specify what is needed, not how to achieve it. The need should
be known early in the program.
8. Contribute to trust and candid communication between the govern*
ment and industry— the customer and the contractor.
9. Strengthen the program manager's role and clarify the lines of
authority, responsibility, and accountability.
10. Discourage "cookbook" approaches.
11. Recognize that acquisition begins with description of objectives
rather than the objects.
12. Recognize the desirability of a number of different system solutions
(options).
13. Avoid premature introduction of detailed requirements.
14. Allow contractors to propose the technical approach, the main
design features, the subsystems, and the alternatives to schedule,
cost, and capabilities.
15. Emphasize the contractor's role in tailoring to the minimum essen-
tial specifications, standards, management systems, and data.
16. Place greater reliance on meaningful competition, i.e.,
demonstrated performance rather than paper promises.
17. Recognize the need to increase the accuracy and credibility of cost
estimates when hardware demonstration is proposed.
18. Preclude "technical leveling" and "cost auctioning."
19. Shorten, or do not unnecessarily lengthen, the acquisition process.
20. Encourage cost-effectiveness trade-offs.
21. Authorize the use of contractors' data formats.
22. Allow contractors to determine the requirements to be placed on
their suppliers.
23. Tend toward reduced governmerit surveillance.
24. Not duplicate the policy/requirements of other documents.
25. Be consistent with OMB Circular A-109.
































































































































































































process delivered 32 initiatives, presented in Figure 15,
which were implemented by OSD in March, 1981. Less than a
year later, these initiatives were revised through a grouping
process and were subsequently reissued [Ref. 16: 54-70].
DODD 5000.1 has again been revised, eliminating review
channels for Milestone I and creating a transition phase
between the full-scale development phase and the production
deployment phase. Other important documents are in revision
status
.
In order to provide better control in the cost area,
Congress enacted the 1982 Defense Authorization Act.
In the fiscal year 1982 Defense Authorization Act, a
two-tiered reporting requirement was established to
identify programs that have significant unit cost
growth. The purpose is to provide a means by which
Congress can become aware of cost growth early enough
to take remedial action. The baseline for the reports
is the cost presented in the March 1981 SAR. The so-
called Nunn Amendment requires that service secretaries
report the following information: programs in which the
total acquisition unit cost is over 15 percent above the
level of March 1981; and programs for which the pro-
curement unit for fiscal year 1982 is over 15 percent
above the level of March 1981. If unit costs exceed
the baseline by 25 percent or more the Secretary of
Defense must make a written certification pertaining
to the systems requirement within 30 days after the
report by the service secretary. All thresholds are
measured in current rather than constant dollars.
Authority to obligate funds for a program is automati-
cally terminated if the service secretary does not
submit a report within 30 days or if the Secretary of
Defense fails to certify the system requirement within
60 days of the reported breach [Ref. 17: 7].
"In December (1981) , 23 systems exceeded the 15 percent




THE CARLUCCI ACQUISITION IMPROVEMENT ACTIONS
1. Reaffirm Acquisition Management Principles
2. Increase Use of Preplanned Product Improvement
3. Implement Multiyear Procurement
4. Increase Program Stability
5. Encourage Capital Investment to Enhance Productivity
6. Budget to Most Likely Costs
7. Use Economical Production Rates
8. Assure Appropriate Contract Type
9. Improve System Support and Readiness
10. Reduce Administrative Costs and Time
11. Budget for Technological Risk
12. Provide Front-End Funding for Test Hardware
13. Reduce Governmental Legislation Related to Acquisition
14. Reduce Number of 000 Directives
15. Enhance Funding Flexibility
16. Provide Contractor Incentives to Improve Reliability and Support
17. Decrease OSARC Briefing and Data Requirements
18. Budget for inflation
19. Forecast Business Base Condltlona
20. Improve Source Selection Process
21. Develop and Use Standard Operation and Support Systems
22. Provide More Appropriate Oesign-to-Cost Goals
23. implement Acquisition Process Decisions
24. Reduce OSARC Milestones
25. Submit MENS with Service POM
26. Revise DSARC Membership
27. Retain USORE as Defense Acquisition Executive
28. Raise Dollar Thresholds for DSARC Review
29. Integrate OSARC and PP6S Process
30. Increase PM Visibility of Support Resources




Presently DOD is busy defending itself from the
onslaught of investigations initiated by Congress from
concern over the present size and predicted growth of DOD '
s
portion of the budget. These investions typically culmi-
nate in Congressional hearings.
F. OBSERVATIONS
The following observations are drawn from the previous
review:
1. Each administration is marked by its development
of a new series of specifications, standards, and methods
to minimize and control costs.
2. Each administration has altered its budget inter-
action process.
3. Each administration has revised its organizational
structure
.
It is apparent from the above observations that a plethora
of heroic patches to the acquisition and budgeting process
has been developed, few of which have shown any significant
positive results. Cost growth still exists.
Future options concerning cost growth include continuing
to:
- research the subject to death,
- observe continual cost growth year after year,
- develop more patches for the acquisition process.
Other options are to wait for Congress to control DOD
spending through ceiling limitations, or DOD could regain
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credibility by recognizing where its faults lie and solving
its own problem.
G. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has shown that a successful method to
control cost growth has not been found.
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IV. SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
This chapter is divided into two basic sections. The
first is a discussion of management principles as they
relate to organizational design. These principles are
incorporated in Chapter V to surface the discrepancies
between the acquisition process as it now exists and static
principles of successful organizational design. Sources
for these principles are many, and each author appears to
have a slightly different viewpoint. Likewise, the follow-
ing is the researcher's rendition of management principles.
The second section of this chapter is an amalgamation of
the principles, discussing what a good manager should do.
A. STATIC PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN
This section is an amalgamation of static principles for
organizational design compiled and assembled by the researcher,
using the many renowned authors versed in this topic. The
static principles of organizational design to be employed
in later chapters are as follows
:
1 . Span of Control
This is a number which measures how many people report
directly to a common manager. This once was thought to be
approximately seven as this was believed to be the maximum




This corresponds to the natural abilities of a human
mind being capable o£ considering only five to seven topics
at once. Variances to this number alter the effectiveness
of the manager. An increase effects less control; a decrease
effects more control.
2 . Clear Goal Setting
This is the principle of every suborganization
establishing objectives (goals) which enhance and supplement
the primary organization's goals. Goal achievement is moni-
tored by realistic performance indicators, not an abundance
of performance indicators but only a few which accurately
represent the organization's goals.
This management principle is the single most important
principle of them all although a review of the literature
suggests it is most often overlooked. Without this principle,
the organization has no raison d'etre
. The amount of aware-
ness of the goals by the organization's members is propor-
tional to the effort directed toward the achievement of the
goals. Thus it is upper management's responsibility to
clearly communicate these goals to sub-organizations.
This principle fringes on the often discussed clarity
of delegation principle which espouses that a manager should
clarify whether he desires a subordinate to look into a
problem, take action, or respond somewhere in between. How-
ever, for the purpose of this thesis, goal setting as a





This is the rule that each person in the organization
should have one and only one direct superior to whom he or
she is accountable on any aspect of the job. The principle
is central to the concept of command.
In practice, the close interplay between line and
staff roles in a functional organization sometimes requires
that an employee be responsible to several persons in ful-
filling his or her complete job requirements. This is
acceptable practice provided the employee's supervisors do
not have overlapping authority over any set of common tasks,
thus creating the possibility of conflicting directives with
respect to a given task [Ref. 19: 355].
4 Short Chain of Command
This principle maintains that the number of distinct
management levels in the hierarchial chain of command should
be kept as small as possible. The phrase "as small as
possible" is relative to the size of the organization. It
connotes the elimination of unnecessary levels of management
which impede effective decision making. The benefits of
this rule are accurate communication and quick response time
to directives [Ref. 20: 26].
5 Complete Delegation
This is the principle that each manager must have
adequate responsibility and authority to perform his job.
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In turn, he is lOO-o accountable for the performance of his
job within the realm of his responsibility and authority.
The fruitfulness of this rule requires that responsibility
equal authority and vice versa.
Successful use of the next rule, the exception
principle, is contingent on complete delegation.
In evaluating the size of bureaucracies today, one
notices that the most important resource of the organization
is its people. Studies have shown that when faith is placed
in people, they will perform to the ability they perceive
top management expects (Theory Y) . This is one of the
hypotheses which make organizational development a successful
science
.
6 . Management by Exception
This is the rule which allows routine decisions to be
made at the lower levels of management while decisions which
are beyond the scope of the responsibility and authority of
the lower level management rise to upper management. This is
the rule managers fear the most for, if they delegate too much
of their decision making responsibility, they feel they will
lose their power base. In actuality, it frees the executive
to fully evaluate the consequences of the more difficult de-
cisions with which he should be concerned. Practice of this
principle complements the short chain of command principle
when used harmoniously with the complete delegation principle.
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7. Maintenance of Resources
This principle holds that an organization should
take care of its resources. Resources include financial
status, equipment, facilities and, most importantly, people.
The focus of this discussion will be on people as they are
responsible for the other resources. An organization must
show that it is genuinely concerned for its people before
the people respond with commensurate concern for the organi-
zation. Maintenance of people requires hygiene factors
(prestige and pay) as well as motivational factors (job
satisfaction, recognition, control in job, achievement and
growth). For efficient use of people, these factors must
be adjusted on an individual basis. The discussion of OD
will provide more details on this balance.
The next three principles are necessary for organi-
zational design but have less to do with management tech-
niques than the previous rules as they are more structurally
dependent than the above seven principles.
8. Specialization
This rule pertains to the organizational structure/






This is the rule to determine the size of administra-
tive units within the organization so that they are geared
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toward equivalent outputs using equivalent resources
[Re£. 20: 29].
10 . Decentralization
This is the organizational philosophy of placing the
decision making process at the structurally convenient
location in the organization. It is similar to the excep-
tion principle and complete delegation principle except that
it is structurally dependent [Ref. 20: 30].
None of the above principles works independently
of the others
.
At this point, it must be mentioned that static
principles are sufficient for a stable and static organi-
zation but today's environment, like the past and the future,
are dynamic. As a minimum, the most stable organizations
have turnover with which to contend.
These dynamics of an organization should never be
neglected. OD is a science which considers at all times
the change in the environment and the organization as fully
described in Chapter VI.
B. WHAT MANAGERS SHOULD DO
The researcher Henry Mintzberg, of Canada's McGill
University, made one of the few rigorous studies of how
effective managers use their time. They don't regularly
block out large chunks of time for planning, organizing,
motivating, and controlling, as most authorities suggest
they ought. Their time, on the contrary, is fragmented,
the average interval devoted to any one issue being nine
minutes
.
Andrew Pettigrew, a British researcher, studied
the politics of strategic decision making and was fasci-
nated by the internal properties of organizations. He
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showed that companies often hold on to flagrantly faulty
assumptions about their world for as long as a decade,
despite overwhelming evidence that that world has changed
and they probably should too [Ref. 21* 7].
Managers should continuously analyze the environment and
change their agency accordingly. They should ensure communi-
cation is not inhibited, reinforce and reiterate the goals
of the agency to the agency and the world, and they should
control through the use of effective performance indicators.
They should look for environmental changes and maintain an
open mind when facing potential changes to their organization
With a frim grasp of the successful manager's role and
successful management principles, it is an opportune time to





V. DISCUSSION OF CAUSES OF COST GROWTH
This chapter discusses the causes of cost growth from
the perspective of those groups responsible to the public
for the acquisition of major weapons systems. These groups
are Congress, the DOD structure, program management and the
contractors. A section for other major causes of cost growth
considered in the literature review is included in this
chapter. It should be noted that this chapter diverts from
the conventional categories (economic, engineering, schedule,
quantity, etc.) used by the SAR, CBO, Rand and other study
groups to categorize causes in order to diagnose this prob-
lem from the viewpoint of responsibility and organizational
design.
The single most significant cause of cost growth is
discussed in the category "Other." This is the competitive
and adversarial relationships of and between the afore-
mentioned groups: Congress, DOD structure, program manage-
ment and the contractors
.
The plethora of quotes in this section is necessary to
take advantage of the abundance of previous research per-
formed on this subject.
A review of the table of contents for this chapter,
especially the division of the subsections, is strongly





This section examines the cause o£ cost growth as con-
tributed to by Congress.
1 . Inadequate Funding and Program Instability
Inadequate and inconsistent funding necessitates
program changes by program managers and contractors. These
changes affect the effort and speed of research and develop
ment , the schedule for production, and the production rates
The most frequent root cause for schedule slippage
mentioned in the SAR's (and in Congressional hearings)
is inadequate annual funding. This reason was given
in more than 31 SAR programs we [Rand] examined. An
even larger proportion (one-half) of the programs at
least three years past DSARC II blamed schedule slip-
page on inadequate funding. Frequently, funding cuts
are made by the Congress because, in its view, there
has been a failure to justify the program adequately.
The Congress has been reluctant to fund programs un-
til all of the outstanding issues are studied and
resolved [Ref . 14: 92]
.
To accommodate this program budget reduction,
schedule changes are usually required so as to reduce
near term spending; the result is schedule stretch-
out with some activities (and production) postponed
to later years [Ref. 14: 71]
During the production phase, this schedule stretch-out
prevents buying in economic order quantities and therefore
contributes to cost growth.
Program instability is further exacerbated by
Congress, with the help of GAO and staff, reviewing each




In the early 1970 's, a private group of 200 leading
businessmen and educators issued national policy statements
on Congressional budgeting and federal programs. Some of
their observations are paraphrased below:
- Congress cannot oversee the entire federal budget
each year on an item-by-item basis.
- Congress is involved in program details to the point
of interfering with responsibilities [Ref. 24: 32-33].
This program instability contributes to cost growth by
diverting managers ' efforts toward satisfying the whims
of Congress
.
2. Contractor Favoritism in Congress
The political environment of Congress affects a
program's management through social economic restraints and
pork barreling. Of the two, pork barreling probably has
the worse effect on program management. Pork barreling, or
the scramble for defense projects by Congressmen for
constituents back home, often seems to be the overriding
concern of members of Congress. Within Congress the review
channels of the Authorization, Appropriation, and Congressional
Hearing committees provide ample opportunity for Congressmen
to incorporate their needs and inputs. Republican Congressman
William Whitehurst of Virginia defends two new nuclear air-
craft carriers being built in his Norfolk, Virginia, district.
Democratic Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia defends Lockheed's
controversial C-5 transport planes produced in Georgia.
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Senator William Cohen of Maine, Chairman o£ the Seapower
Subcommittee, took advantage o£ approved funding for three
AEGIS-system cruisers and had part of their production
assigned to his state [Ref. 25: 27].
Even those doves who argue most for defense cuts have
their pet interests: House Speaker Tip O'Neill and
Senator Edward Kennedy support the F-18 because its
engine is built in Massachusetts; Senator Alan
Cranston supports the B-1 because its prime contractor
is based in California; Senator Carl Levin supports the
M-1 tank, built in Michigan; Senator William Proxmire,
who likes to hand out the Golden-Fleece Awards to
others, added 100 million to the defense budget last
year by winning approval for a new mine sweeper to be
built--where else?--in Wisconsin [Ref. 25: 27].
Except for the mine sweeper, all the aforementioned programs
are controversial in either cost growth, performance, or both.
Congress, in its effort to gain votes from con-
stituents, has enacted social economics restraints with
which DOD must comply. Examples of this legislation
include the Small Business Administration, requirement to
procure prison-made products, the convict labor act and
others
.
The underlying insinuation that all contractors
favored by Congressional backing contribute to the cost
growth problem, of course, is not 100% true. The researcher
did not discover any data on the performance of contractors
with a strong backing in Congress. Nevertheless, it is
apparent that the incentive the contractor requires to achieve
cost goals is diminished with strong Congressional backing.
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It should also be noted that this preferential treatment
of certain contractors disrupts any previous program
planning that managers have attempted, thus adding to cost
growth.
3. Conclusions
Congressional policies and efforts to manage DOD
violate four management principles: (1) span of control,
(2) clear goal setting, (3) unity of command, and (3) com-
plete delegation.
Span of control is violated by the Congress attempt-
ing to evaluate the annual budget on an item-by-item basis.
Congressional intervention reveals two ways in
which the clear goal setting principles are not adhered to.
The first is through the Congress providing funds but not
participating in the responsibility of setting goals for the
national defense level. The second infringement on clear
goal setting arises from Congress providing inadequate or
deficient funds. This requires all management levels from
DOD to the program manager to reassess the necessary tasks
to achieve previous design goals.
Changes in the funding plans also indicate nonobser-
vance of the complete delegation principle as the Congress
(through funding changes) hoards responsibility and authority
from program management. In addition, contractor favoritism




Congressional favoritism to contractors and funding
deficiencies evidence violation to the unity of command
principle as Congress skips levels of DOD management in its
effort to directly control programs.
B. DOD ACQUISITION STRUCTURE
1 . Lack of Clear Goals
Clear goals are necessary to direct a program and
its supporting subordinations in a unified, homogeneous
course or direction. When goals are not clear, funds, time,
and effort will be spent on purposes unrelated to a goal,
causing cost growth. Goals, in terms of design require-
ments of a weapon system, should defend against threats as
perceived by the JCS. Unfortunately, the program managers
must concern themselves with securing funds from Congress and
within DOD to support their programs. Congress and individuals
of DOD have other goals the program manager must incorporate
into his program before he is able to secure funding. This
creates a dichotomy of goals between designing to meet a
threat and developing a program to secure funding. This pro-
vides a situation for the program manager to decide goals
instead of striving for them. In this case, he decides on
the goals that enhance his own career and exercises the
securing of funds
.
The lack of clear goals originates at the top of
the DOD structure. A former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
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o£ Staff, General David Jones, stated in the defense guidance
report produced by the Pentagon: "It does little to set
meaningful priorities" when discussing the rationale for
buying weapons [Ref. 25: 27].
In the late 1960 's a private group of 200 leading
businessmen and educators issued a statement on national
policy, stating:
Basic purposes, as well as choices between
alternative means to achieve these purposes, tends
to get lost in a staggering mass of budget documenta-
tion.
Emphasis has been placed on numbers of people,
contracts to be let, grants or subsidies to be given
and things to be purchased instead of on serving pur-
poses or gaining results.
To have meaning and validity, the group said, budgets must
be reviewed in terms of basic purposes [Ref. 26: 12].
A conservative defense analyst, Edward Luttwak,
has written: "In lieu of strategy at all levels we have
only budgeting, programming and politics." It is common
knowledge that clarity of goals is one of the fundamental
management principles of an efficient and effective organization
2 . Poor Implementation of Directives
The following is an excerpt from a NAVMAT- sponsored
cost study:
We believe the most common reason for failing to imple-
ment recommendations is that management does not take
vigorous action to insure implementation of the best
recommendations. It is common practice for one level
of management to direct a lower level of management a




Other reasons for disappointing progress in imple-
menting recommendations follow:
- Most implementation activity has been directed toward
trying to show that recommendations have been imple-
mented or closed out instead of monitoring to see
if the purpose of the recommendations has been achieved.
- Many recommendations suggested specific changes and
actions when a coordinated set of actions aimed at
broad restructuring is necessary to resolve under-
lying problems.
- Many recommendations have been aimed at symptoms
instead of basic causes and have suggested actions
that could not correct the problem.
- Many recommendations do not come to grips with the
fundamental incentives to motivate people to do what
they do. (There are cases of past recommendations
being implemented halfheartedly, or not at all, be-
cause they are really reverse incentives.) Others
are implemented because they are directed at the
wrong level of management (where implementation is
beyond the scope of authority) [Ref. 27: 10].
Further evidence of poor implementation of directives
is revealed in a GAO study of 28 selected weapons systems
which found five instances of inconsistencies with the
Office of Management and Budget Circular A-109 [Ref. 28: 9].
When a directive for controlling costs is not imple-
mented, naturally cost growth will proliferate.
3. Promoting Spendthrifts
Within the DOD structure, there exists a natural
proliferation of spenders in the higher ranks who have
attained their positions by emulating their big-spending
superiors. One analyst has stated: "No one ever gets
78

promoted for killing a project" [Ref. 25: 26]. "In addition,
stars and bars are awarded for pushing a major project to
completion, whatever the price" [Ref. 25: 26]. And in another
paper, Dr. W. B. LeBerge stated:
The figure of merit by which senior officials are
scored is how well they can convince their military and
civilian superiors that their own program should be
funded instead of someone else's.... All the incen-
tives are on selling [Ref. 29: 59].
It is generally conceded to be exceedingly risky
for a military officer or a civilian contractor to be
open, honest, and conservative. It is far less risky
to make grand promises and conceal what is really going
on [Ref. 29: 56]
.
4. Too Many Reviewers
As described in Chapter II, a major weapon system
must be reviewed at many levels. In the Navy, for example,
the review of a major weapon system begins at the source
selection committees and continues through the SYSCOM, NAVMAT,
OPNAV , SECNAV, OSD , and finally, cost improvement groups
(CAIG and ISMO) . The consequences of Congressional review
have been previously discussed. The other services have
similar review structures. This review structure allows
ample opportunity for reduction of goals, also previously
discussed in relation to cost growth causes.
5
.
Service Competition for Funds
Competition among services for funds is most visible
at the JCS level. This is thoroughly explained by Ronald Fox:
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The Secretary of Defense himself works under considerable
pressure from the military. Although the ultimate de-
cisions affecting the acquisition of weapon systems are
his responsibility, he does his work as a member of a
team which includes the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretaries of the military services. Decisions become
particularly difficult for him when he must choose among
systems promoted by competing services or when a system
described as essential by a military Chief of Staff is
not deemed cost effective by the Systems Analysis Groups
[Ref. 30: 100].
With the services competing for funds, not only is
the incentive on performance lost but the objective and
effort toward monitoring the spending of funds is forgotten,
which, of course, causes cost growth [Ref. 29: 83]. (It is
implied here that the contractor will take advantage of the
program manager's naivete. This is further explained in
Section C of this chapter.)
6 . Program Manager Positions
The position of program manager is the focus of each
weapons acquisition program. Thus this position must demand
special attention. Unfortunately, the last major attention
it received was from four of the ten Packard Initiatives of
1969. These are:
5. Improve training of program managers by establishing
military training courses and schools to prepare them
for the job
.
6. Strengthen the authority of program managers,
especially by giving them a clear written charter.
7. Attract superior officers to program management,




8. Reduce the turnover rate of program managers so that
they have longer job tenure.
The Rand study [Ref. 14] presents data showing that the tenure
of the program manager has increased and that the program
manager charters are written but advancement in the other two
areas is not discussed [Ref. 31 16-17] . Of the 32 famed
Carlucci initiatives, not one addresses the program manager's
position.
7. Conclusions
The DOD acquisition structure does not adhere to the
first six management techniques:
1. Span of control,
2. Clear goal setting,
3. Unity of command,
4. Short chain of command,
5. Complete delegation,
6. Exception principle,
7. Maintenance of resources.
Breach of span of control is observed whenever one
person (or even a committee) is responsible for anywhere from
50 to 5 00 programs. Consider ARB , CNO, DSARC , and CAIG as
examples
.
Noncompliance with the clear goal setting principle
is fully discussed in Section B.l of this chapter.
Disregard of the unity of command is witnessed when
someone from a higher position of the program (perhaps from
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contractor influence) attempts to influence the program
through advocacy or direct intervention.
Nonobservance of the short chain of command is easily
evidenced by the many review levels within each service, then
through DOD, and finally Congress.
Noncompliance with the complete delegation principle
is witnessed by authority and responsibility for a program
not located at one or two levels but at a minimum of five
levels for any single program. Poor implementation of direc-
tives is indicative of indifference to authority, one facet
of complete delegation.
Violation of the exception principle is caused by the
many higher levels which have review responsibility of all
decisions, not merely the decisions which are beyond the
ability of the program manager.
Disregard for maintenance of resources (personnel
in this case) is observed from personnel not implementing
directives and by the promotion of spendthrifts.
C. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
This section focuses on the DOD program office/program
manager contributors to cost growth.
1 . Underestimating Costs
Program managers underestimate costs for several
reasons. One is that all weapons systems compete for funds
at many levels within DOD and Congress. Thus "there is an
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obvious incentive for the proponents of a system to under-
estimate its costs in order to increase its probability of
acceptance" [Ref. 32: 9]. Another reason is the program
manager's submission of tight budgets in order to force
control of costs.
As dollars are the most widely used control mechanism,
a practice of minimizing estimates of future costs has
evolved as a management technique for attempting to
impress contractors with the continuing need to pro-
duce more for less in a shorter period of time [Ref. 33:
55].
A third reason is that some managers are just over-
optimistic. "Many studies advance detailed and repeated
recommendations concerning budget overoptimism and program
turbulence" [Ref. 27: 12].
The military especially endorses this thought for the
obvious reason:
Our military bias is to get as much as we can get....
We are the ones who have to fight the wars, not the
people in the Congress or the average taxpayers"
[Ref. 30: 188] .
2. Underestimating ILS
In terms of cost growth, the underestimating of
logistics elements usually is not recognized until late in
the life cycle. For instance, underestimating manpower,
reliability, and maintainability requirements ultimately
has the effect of increasing the manning requirements
throughout the deployment phase many fold. Further
evidence of underestimation of ILS is revealed in a recent
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GAO report which examined 24 major defense systems.
We identified instances where the planned logistics
(that is, parts, test equipment, personnel training,
facilities, tools, technical data, and so forth) did
not meet system availability and wartime usage
requirements [Ref. 34: 4].
3. Naive Monitoring
A recent NAVMAT study conducted by Joseph Grosson on
cost growth stated:
Most industry interviewees volunteered the perception
that Navy acquisition personnel were intelligent, hard-
working, and dedicated. They all stressed disappoint-
ment at the naivete of these same personnel in the
business management arena.... We have project managers
who are superb naval officers but who have little prac-
tical experience in dealing with industry [Ref. 27: 12].
Another article recognized that "program management has been
criticized for its lack of adequate control of contractors"
[Ref. 31: 105]. Contractors are more than willing to take
advantage of the naive government program manager, creating
a situation leading to cost growth. (This point is further
described in Section D.l of this chapter.)
4. Inadequate Use of Resources
DOD has untold resources of material and manned
laboratories. In addition, DOD programs have begun at
square one (R^D) without DOD taking advantage of the estab-
lished science of industry. Materially, DIPEC owns 20% of
the productive equipment of the United States. The research-
er did not ascertain the amount of this production equipment
in use presently. By not determining resources available
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within the government for use in individual programs, the
program manager must satisfy all his needs through the
contractor, thus contributing to cost growth.
5. Gold Plating
The desire for a program manager to continually-
incorporate the latest technology into his weapon system
is referred to as gold plating. Systems should be designed
to accommodate degradation in production but this should
be the designer's (usually the contractor's) responsibility
to incorporate into his prototypes or pilot production models
One explanation for gold plating is that
...during a design development, engineers generally are
highly optimistic and have a can-do attitude for the
practically impossible. Their reputation is at stake,
and by reputation American engineering is always at the
leading edge of the state-of-the-art. Thus, there is a
tendency to overdesign a system and expect any problems
to be easily overcome during development. "If we tweak
this gadget here, or if we use this special blend of
materials, this system will then be a real hummer"
[Ref. 35: 106].
The expense of this gold plating is the element of cost
adding to cost growth.
6. Conclusions
Management principles not adhered to by program
management include
:
1. the clear goal setting principle,
2. the unity of command principle,
3. the complete delegation principle,
4. the exception principle.

5. the maintenance o£ resources principle.
Clear goal setting, as discussed previously, applies
here in program management also.
Noncompliance with the unity o£ command principle is
evidenced by the requirement for program management to satisfy
the requirements of many reviewers and funding sources.
Nonperformance of the complete delegation principle
is evidenced by program management, being aware of its lack
of authority and responsibility, purposely underestimating
XLS and costs in order to gain commitment from Congress and
superiors
.
Nonobservance of the exception principle is evidenced
by the program manager being so busy seeking funds that he
does not have time to manage important decisions which arise
involving the efficient use of those funds.
Disregard for maintenance of resources (personnel)
is witnessed by acknowledgment that the naive program
managers are not adequately trained for their positions and





The term buying-in refers to the contractor purposely
underestimating the cost of a weapon system to secure award
of the contract from the government and planning later to
either swallow or compensate for lost costs.
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Each contractor knows that, if he can win the first
competitive bid, he will be facilitated by the govern-
ment or assured of a contract that will allow him to
write-off facilitation, that he will have a labor base
to absorb his fixed overhead, that he will be able to
absorb company- sponsored future development work, and
that he can eventually make a profit. He knows if he
loses he will be unable to do any of these things
[Ref. 29: 57]
.
Industry interviewees candidly admit to buying- in
and they explain in very rational terms why that is done.
Most told us that the buy-in was a conscious decision
driven by the need to underbid the competition and fit
their perception of the Navy's budget profile. They
intend at the offset to swallow most of the underbid,
hoping to implement in-house efficiencies, etc., to
remain in contract limits after award. Things go rea-
sonably well for about one year after the award, during
the initial paper and start-up stages. When the larger
hard-core effort is undertaken, the bow wave eventually
falls back as they contractors and their projections
of cost growth exceed levels they were willing to absorb
previously. Then we are hit with the surprise cost




Unnecessary Engineering Change Proposal (ECP)
Generation
This is a very difficult cost growth cause on which
to find research data. However, the researcher has had
several discussions with other acquisition specialists who
recognize that the contractor ultimately reports to the
stock market. In effect, this drives his need to develop
profits any way possible and the most accessible vehicle
for this is to develop unnecessary ECP's.
3. Conclusions
Research of the need for the military-industrial
base is beyond the scope of this thesis. These cost growth
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causes were presented to supplement previous discussion and
to support training recommendations of the last chapter.
F. OTHER CAUSES DISCUSSED IN THE LITERATURE.
1 . Competitive Relationships of the Above Groups
The competitive, sometimes adversarial, relationships
among the above hierarchy of groups contribute to the cost
growth problem by situating each of the groups in a position
of defense or offense, whichever the case may be, as opposed
to focusing attention on the actual development of the program
This predicament is exacerbated by the contractor who uses
this environment which is conducive to swaying one part or
the other. Consider the situation wherein a program manager
evaluates a design requirement that the contractor is unable
to achieve. Yet because the contractor's friend at a higher
level, say OSD, sits on the review board, criticism of the
performance goes unnoticed. This is acceptable to the pro-
gram manager since his main goal is securing funds.
The Institute for Defense Analysis expanded upon
this hypothesis, citing the
Competitive environment
within branch of service
within service
among services
DOD vs. other federal agencies






...we believe that the competitive environment in which
weapon systems are developed is the major factor leading
to cost growth . All weapons systems must compete tor
funds at many levels within the federal government
[Re£. l: 9]
.
2 . Inflation and Technological Advancement
These cost growth causes are often discussed in the
literature and media. For that reason only, are they listed
here. The researcher attributes no real program cost growth
to these causes. By definition, the increase/decrease in
inflation should accompany a corresponding increase/decrease
in revenues. Also by definition, technology should facili-
tate the design as well as create temporary impasses as it
has done in the past and will continue to do in the future.
F. CONCLUSIONS
As it stands now, the program manager has little account-
ability. Should a problem, major or minor, occur in his
program, he has many scapegoats for the situation. They are
indicative of the faulty organizational design; the program
manager can blame Congress or higher DOD level interference
as the cause of his problem. The fact that his reasons for
problems are accepted is indicative of acknowledgment by all
members of the organization that the organizational design
is faulty.
It has been vividly shown that the relationships of and
within Congress, the DOD acquisition structure, and program
management violate all the necessary static principles of
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organizational design for efficient and effective acquisition
of major weapons systems.
With this gross violation of management principles, each
group has ample validity in placing blame for its problems
on any of the other groups. (This placing of blame is
substantiated and thoroughly discussed in an article by the
Systems Acquisition Assessment which reviewed the major
studies of the last ten years [Ref. 36: 12].) Designated
program management has been shown not to actually control
the major weapon system acquisition process, an unfortunate
violation of management principles which contributes to cost
growth. It is the intent of this thesis, after a discussion
of a recent science, organizational development, which can
help solve the cost growth problem, to make recommendations




A. DESCRIPTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
A look at the controversial subject of Japanese manage-
ment versus American management will help introduce this topic
The media's attention has focused on effective and efficient
Japanese management as compared to poorer American management.
This perception of American management is extremely skewed.
In actuality, many American corporations have been amazingly
successful due to their management techniques. Consider, as
examples, IBM, Fairchild, IT^T, General Electric, General
Dynamics, Johnson and Johnson, and 3M, just to mention a few
[Ref. 21]. These companies achieved their success through
effective management techniques similar to the holistic
approaches OD embraces.
The following quote enhances this tought
:
The findings from the excellent companies amount to
an upbeat message. There is good news from America. Good
management practice today is not only resident in Japan.
But, more important, the good news comes from treating
people decently and asking them to shine, and from pro-
ducing things that work. Scale efficiences give way to
small units with turned-on people. Precisely planned
R§D efforts aimed at big bang products are replaced by
armies of dedicated champions.... Hierarchy and three-
piece suits give way to first names, shirtsleeves, hoopla,
and project based flexibility. Working according to fat
rule books is replaced by everyone's contributing.
Even management's job becomes more fun. Instead of
brain games in the sterile ivory tower, it's shaping values
and reinforcing through coaching and evangelism in the
field--with the worker and in support of the cherished




1. Definition of OP
There are five important elements in the definition
of organizational development which will be elaborated upon
further. OD is: (1) managed from the top; (2) uses system-
wide change; (3) consideres planned changes only; (4) is
long-term, and (5) uses behavior science methodologies.
Managed from the top, OD gives the top manager control.
Changes to the organization are not accomplished without his
compliance. He designs the goals and objectives for his
organization
.
A system-wide change, OD considers all the compo-
nents of the system/organization to ensure fit and congruence,
from goals to people's needs and expectations, and the culture
they live in. This includes the needs of other sub-organizations
Incorporating planned changes only, OD realizes
the organization must react to its environment (i.e.,
culture to public laws) . Changes to the organization to
accommodate the environment are planned to prevent the
environments from controlling the organization.
Long term in range, OD changes are designed for
long-term effects. This requires recognizing that the en-
vironments are constantly changing and, as such, the organi-
zation must be capable of incorporating/assimilating these
changes
.
OD uses behavior science methodologies. An
organization's most important resource is its people.
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Incorporating behavior science techniques based upon studies
and evaluation o£ people within organizations, it is possi-
ble to make effective use of people and encourage their
optimal productivity.
2 . Understanding the Organization
This section presents two concepts essential for
understanding any organization. The purpose of this section
is to emphasize the relationship of the organization to the
world around it and to the organization's internal compo-
nents. The success of balancing these relationships directly
affects the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization.
The concept referring to the ability of an organization to
adapt is organizational health [Ref. 22: 6].
a. Congruence and the Organization
The model shown in Figure 16 presents the
organization, represented by the dashed line, and its
dependency on people and the environment. Beer explains
the four components of this model. .
(1) People: Abilities, needs, values, and expecta-
tations of employees.
(2) Process: The behaviors, attitudes, and inter-
actions that occur within the organization at the
individual, group, and intergroup level.
(3) Structures: The formal mechanisms and systems
of the organization that are designed to channel
behavior toward organizational goals and fulfill
member needs. Examples of these include Job descrip-
tion, job evaluation systems, organization structure,



















(4) Environment: The external conditions with which the
organization must deal including its market, customers,
technology, stockholders, government regulations, and
the social culture and values in which it operates,
[Ref. 22: 5-6].
In this perspective the organization is viewed
as a dynamic entity that must vary its "structures and pro-
cesses required by changing conditions and people" [Ref. 22:
4] . Thus it is evident that the structures and processes
developed by managers to operate in one environment are
probably not sufficient for use in another environment.
As indicated by Figure 16, though the people
and organization's environment are not within control of
management, the organizational process and structures are
controllable by management. Ultimately then it is management's
responsibility to maintain congruence between the components
of the model.
An organization's capacity to achieve its goals and ful-
fill member needs is a function of the extent to which
there is congruence between people, process, structures,
and environment [Ref. 22: 5].
b. A Social Systems Model of Organizations
The social systems model of organizations.
Figure 17, is more complex and thorough than the four-
concept organizational model. For some, a detailed study
of each element of the social systems model is necessary
to fully comprehend the usefulness of the model. This
explanation can be found in Beer, Reference 21. The

































































































































































































































diagnosis of an organization. Its use is derived from
knowledge that an organization's elements must be con-
gruent in their relationship to each other.
3 . Synopsis of OP Intervention
A macroscopic view of an OD intervention begins with
gaining commitment from top management to design a more
efficient and effective organization in order to achieve
goals.
The next step, diagnosing the problems of the organi-
zation, requires a comparison of data from different sources,
questionnaires, interviews, diagnostic meetings, etc. This
data is compiled and presented to management. Management
then presents the results to the people, explaining the in-
congruencies in the organization and its desire to correct
them. It is necessary at all times to allow the people of
the organization to know what the intentions are, through
constant feedback, in order to gain involvement from them.
This facilitates the design of the solutions and gains
greater commitment to the change process. Finally, manage-
ment and the workers together design follow-up methods which
will include new performance indicators and meetings for the
sole purpose of ensuring the organization is achieving its
goals. The emphasis here is that the follow-up procedures
are continuous, reassuring the organization's constant
reassessment of its ability to achieve its goals.
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It must be mentioned that every OD intervention
will be different from all others. This fact indicates
the uniqueness of OD as a solution by its recognition
of the commensurate uniqueness of any individual organiza-
tional problem.
4. Models of Intervention
The literature's most renowned authors vary on the
number of steps required in an OD intervention, from three
to seven. This section describes several models. These
models should be viewed as problem solving techniques versus
actual OD interventions. (The primary emphasis of an
intervention includes feedback to the client, management,
and employees which is crucial to the success of the
intervention.
)
a. The Kolb-Frohman Model (Modified)
There are many intervention models as indicated
by Figure 18. However, the researcher's favorite is the
seven-phase Kolb-Frohman Model as modified by Warner Burke
[Ref.. 23: 158-165]. The seven phases follow:
(1) Entry . Initial contact between the con-
sultant and the client organization begins the entry phase.
This phase may include as many as two or three meetings
where the consultant and the client assess whether they can
relate to and trust each other. The consultant will be
interested in the client's readiness for change, the resources




OD MODELS FOR INTERVENTION
KOLB-FROHMAN MODEL SCHEIN MODEL
1. Scouting -<" 1. Initial contact
2. Entry 2. Defining relationships
3. Diagnosis 3. Selecting a setting and
4. Planning - n method of work
5. Action i 4. Data gathering and diagnosis
6. Evaluation i 5. Intervention




LAWRENCE AND LORSCH MODEL
1. Unfreezing 1 . Diagnosis
2. Movement 2. Planning action
3. Refreezing 5. Implement action
4. Evaluation
LIPPIT, WATSON, AND WESTLEY MODEL
1. Development of a need f or change.
2. Establishment of a chan ge relationship.
3. Working toward change.
4. Generalization and stab ilization of change.




OD intervention, and sources of support. Typical sources
of support include the consultant's developed trust with
top management, his expertise, dissatisfied constituent of
the organization, and a possible co-worker.
(2) Contracting . This phase could be very
brief if the entry phase has been smooth. The contract
may be anything from a formal document to a verbal agreement.
More often, the contract is considered to be the exchange of
letters between the two parties. Contract data usually
includes how much the consultant is going to be paid,
handling of sensitive data, amount of responsibility for
change by each party, the role of the consultant and, of
course, specification of the client.
(3) Diagnosis . Though diagnosis may begin at
the entry phase, this phase crystalizes it by gathering and
analyzing data. Specific data-gathering techniques include
observations, interviews, questionnaires and review of
organizational documents. Analyzing the data requires
developing conclusions from the assembled data.
(4) Feedback . The feedback phase improves chances
of success when administered soon after the diagnostic phase,
when it is presented by management (of course, the consultant
first presents it to management), and at an off-site location.
Presenting the results of the diagnosis at an off-site
meeting enhances feelings of a new start. Normally these
meetings are held with top management first, then middle
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management, and finally with the employee group. At these
meetings the diagnosis may be corrected by either the client
system or the consultant.
(5) Planning Change . After two days and within
a week, the meeting for planning change should occur. Parti
cipants may include any combination of the consultants, top
management, and the employees. Greater commitment to the
change is gained from the client system if the change is
developed by the element of the client system from where the
problems (as determined by the diagnosis) originate.
The purposes of the planning phase are (1) to generate
alternative steps for responding collectively to the
problems identified in the diagnosis and (2) to decide
on the step or order of steps to take [Ref. 23: 163].
(6) Intervention . Implementation of the planned
change occurs during this phase.
Some examples of interventions at the individual level
are job redesign and enrichment, training and manage-
ment development, changes in the quality of work life,
management by objectives, and career development. At
the group level, interventions may include team build-
ing, process consultation, or the installation of auton-
omous work groups or quality control circles. Resolving
intergroup conflict might be an intervention, as might
changing such structural dimensions of the organization
as reporting relationships, moving toward or away from
decentralization of authority, modifying physical set-
tings, or creating informal structures in the
organization [Ref. 23: 163].
(7) Evaluation . As it is difficult for the
consultant to be totally objective, it is wise for "someone
other than the consultant to conduct an evaluation of any OD
effort" [Ref. 23: 163]. The depth of evaluation may "range
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from the clients' saying that they are pleased with the out-
come to a systematic research effort employing controls and
multiple data analyses" [Ref. 23: 164]. The evaluation is
significant to the client system as it reinforces the change
effort and to the consultant as it is constructive in evalu-
ating his effectiveness.
(8) Termination . The successful and ideal OD
agent is expected to work himself out of a job, to leave the
client with a follow-up methodology in which the client
monitors itself. However, Burke does not include termination
in his phases for several reasons and the researcher agrees.
A primary role of the OD agents is to serve as guardians
of the new culture. They help to regulate the social
change that has become a new routine in organizational
life [Hornstein et al
.
, 1971] . This regulation may
take a variety oF~forms ranging from periodic checks
with the client managers regarding the continuing effec-
tiveness of changes to more systematic follow-up activi-
ties, such as conducting annual surveys, attending a
manager's staff meetings as a process consultant, or
helping to design and conduct off-site planning or
diagnostic meetings for departments or divisions
[Ref. 23: 163].
Also,
...the process is cyclical (W. L. French, 1969), and
since an organization both is dynamic and naturally
follows the entropic process, there is always a great
deal of consultive work to be done [Ref. 23: 165].
Finally it should be pointed out that these
are phases which blend and overlap to a great extent.
"Phases is an appropriate term also because of the cyclical
nature of the OD process" [Ref. 23: 166].
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b. The Kirk-Lewin Model
The Lewin Model is a simple three-step one, but
it is an effective perspective of change. The first step
in the change process is unfreezing. The unfreezing may
occur from a survey/questionnaire which shows serious
problems in the managerial process of the organization,
thus establishing a need for change.
The second step, movement, could be organization
restructuring, team development, elimination or implementa-
tion of problem-solving techniques or an array of other
interventions focusing on improving the process operation
of the organization.
The third step, refreezing, may include a new
reward system that will positively reinforce the desired
behavior change, a new approach to managing people, or new
norms such as collaboration rather than competition. These
are deliberate steps to ensure that the new state of behavior
remains relatively permanent.
Each of the steps may require some kind of
confrontation or a process of reeducation.
c. Other Models
Other popular models are presented in Figure 18.
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B. ATTITUDES AND CHANGE
1 . Influence of Environment on Employees' Attitudes
The employee's attitude is dependent on the environ-
ment in which he is placed by management. Despite the
emphasis of the organization, market or non-market, the
attitudes of people are affected, changed, and manipulated
similarly. The employee is no different from the reader or
the researcher. Placed in a certain environment, he will
react accordingly. While considering the following arguments,
consider also the bickering environment of the present
acquisition process.
In experiment after experiment, Edward Deci of the
University of Rochester has shown... that people must
believe that a task is inherently worthwhile if they
really are to be committed to it. (In addition, he
found if we too regularly reward a task, we often
vitiate commitment to it.) [Ref. 21: 72]
As a sample case,
...Zimbardo advertised in a newspaper in Palo Alto,
California (a prototypical upper-class community)
,
soliciting volunteers for a "prison" experiment. At
dawn one Saturday morning he went out, picked the
volunteers up, booked them and took them to a wall-
board "prison" in the basement of the Stanford
University psychology building. Within hours after
their arrival, the randomly assigned "guards" started
acting like guards and the randomly assigned prisoners
started acting like prisoners. Well within the first
twenty-four hours, the guards were behaving brutally-
-
both physically and psychologically. By the end of
the second day, a couple of the prisoners were on
the verge of psychotic breakdown and had to be re-
leased from the experiment. "Warden" Zimbardo,
afraid of his own behavior as well as that of others,
stopped the experiment four days into a ten-day
protocol [Ref. 21: 79].
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Analogously what is called "£oot-in-the-door research"
demonstrates the importance of incrementally acting our way
into major commitment. For instance, in one experiment in
Palo Alto, California, most subjects who initially agreed
to put a tiny sign in their front window supporting a cause
(traffic safety) subsequently agreed to display a billboard
in their front yard, which required letting outsiders dig
sizable holes in the lawn. On the other hand, those not
asked to take the first small step turned down the larger
one in ninety-five cases out of a hundred.
Tlie implications are clear: once one can get people
acting, even in small ways, as he wants them to, then he
can convince them to believe in what they are doing. "Doing
things ... leads to ... adaptations ... and commitment; it is the
hallmark of a well run" organization [Ref. 21: 74].
The two cases cited reveal the importance of the
environment or controlling the environment on the attitude
of the employee.
Thus it can be argued that the employee's actions are
dependent on the employee's attitudes which are a function
of how he perceives himself in the organization.
2 . Attitudes toward Change
More often than not, one would see a section on
resistance to change versus attitudes toward change, the
former argument belonging, of course, to the pessimist.
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People resist change--or do they? Does an employee
resist an upward change in pay rate or vacation allowance?
Does a homemaker resist replacement o£ a cranky old dish-
washer for a new one? Does a manager resist an imposed
schedule change that requires him to represent his division
at an important reception for the new company president
rather than finishing his quarterly budget? All these
changes are likely to be welcomed warmly and to be imple-
mented with great cooperation from the people concerned.
What distinguishes these changes from the changes that
people resist strongly is the fact that their nature and
effects are relatively well known and are enthusiastically
desired. The degree of people's resistance to change
depends on the kind of change involved and how well it is
understood. What people resist is not change but loss,
or the possibility of loss (Marris , 1972). [Ref. 23:
51-52]
3. Conclusion
A change can be successful if the environment is
controlled, if the change is seen as an improvement, and if
there is inherent worth in the change.
C. PROFIT VS. NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
To verify that OD can be used in both a profit and
non-profit organization. Appendix B presents a sample case
of each situation.
D. CONCLUSIONS
OD successfully employs the management techniques of
Chapter IV to create/reform an organization which is capable





A. THE AARON RECOMMENDATION
1 . Use OP to Promote Management Principles
It is recommended that an office be established at
the DOD level which will use organization development to pro-
mote management principles. Each service's OD gorup should be
ascended to an organizational status in which implementation
can begin. Naturally, it is prudent to initiate OD on a small-
scale basis with the intent of expanding it through the entire
service.
a. Considerations in the Implementation of OD
To ensure successful OD interventions, it is
necessary to select consultants who have a record of success-
ful interventions
.
If an agency or agency head is not ready or will-
ing for an OD intervention, the effort to intervene will fail.
Commitment is particularly required from top management.
The employees also must recognize a need for change
and be ready for an OD intervention. An OD intervention which
fails to gain commitment from employees and top management
is doomed to failure. A successful OD consultant is able




b. Considerations Concerning Management Principles
(1) Maintenance of Resources
Tenure and training of program managers
are extremely important here. Tenures must be matched to
program lengths in order to personnel to feel full commitment
to the assigned program. Rotating personnel as the system
is designed now should only be used for intern training
programs. Training future program managers is necessary to
maximize efficient use of personnel. Certainly it is prudent
to spend $30,000 to $80,000 to develop an efficient and
effective program manager to manage a $1 million to $6 billion
program.
The training program should stress:
(1) management ethics, (2) program management and acquisition,
(3) organizational development, (4) contracting and solicita-
tion, (5) managerial accounting/financial management,
(6) current technology of the particular program, and
(7) systems analysis.
This program should be at least one year in
length with a repertoire of twelve to sixteen instructors.
This one year of academia will provide a manager (at any
level) with the realistic overview required for efficient
and effective management.
Another aspect of this training is a reeduca-
tion process, proposed for two reasons: (1) to verify that
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the managers have effectively enacted the complete delegation
and management by exception principles which are proven
when the manager leaves the organization and it still
operates effectively and efficiently without him, and (2) to
remove the manager from his position for reeducation in
order to reacquire the objective viewpoint that he brought
to the organization. This retraining should bring him up
to date on new developments in the training areas above and
should perhaps coincide with his vacation plans to ensure a
long separation from his office.
(2) Goal Setting
Time commitment to cost control by DOD
could be promulgated through a highly publicized personnel
reward program. This program would indicate to the contractor
as well as to the program personnel DOD's dedication to cost
control
.
Assuming that sometime in the future DOD
is able to show significant achievement in cost control to
both Congress and the public, it may be possible to create
realistic goal setting between Congress and DOD. This goal
setting would require both Congress and DOD to decide upon
a perceived threat supported by specific programs to which
a fixed percentage of the federal budget is permanently
legislated. This approach is similar to the program full
funding approach discussed by Ravetti in 1977 [Ref. 37] and
alluded to by Ronald Fox [Ref. 30].
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B. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
It is not the purpose of this thesis to elaborate on the
other benefits of OD of which there are many. However, for
further information and/or to start this process, it is
recommended that readers contact any or all of the services'
organization development groups and/or the researcher for
further information:
Navy: Human Resources Management Plans and Policy
Branch (NMPC-6)




Army: Organizational Effectiveness Office
HQDA, DACS-DME, Pentagon




Air Force: Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and
Personnel
HQUSAF/MPXH
Major Roger A. Bossart or Major Lee Johnson
A-224-8270
202-694-8270
Researcher: Naval Electronics Systems Command





































Air Force Logistics Command
Air Force Systems Acquisition Review Council
Air Force Systems Command
Acquisition Review Board
Acquisition Review Committee
Army Systems Acquisition Review Council
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Approval for Service Use




Chief of Naval Operations
Cost Schedule/Control Systems Criteria
Chief of Staff of the Army
Development and Readiness Command
Decision Coordinating Paper
Department of the Navy, Systems Acquisition
Review Council
Department of Defense
Department of Defense Directive
Department of Defense Instruction
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Development Test
Functional Implementation Plan
Final Operational Test and Evaluation
Government Accounting Office
Hardware Lead Time




































Headquarters United States Air Force
Human Resources Management Center
Indirect Cost Monitoring Office
Integrated Logistics Support






National Security Industrial Association
Organizational Development
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff,
Operations and Plans Acquisition
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff,
Research, Development and Acquisition
Office of Management and Budget
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Operational Test





Research Development Test 5 Evaluation
Research Management System
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Air Force
Selected Acquisition Information Management System





SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SECNAV Secretary of the Navy
SOA Separate Operating Agencies
SSG Special Study Group
STF Special Task Force
SYSCOM Systems Command





This appendix presents two cases which substantiate
that OD is used in profice organizations as well as non-
profit organizations. The source for these cases is:
Rolf E. Rogers and Robert H. Mclntire, Organization and
Management Theory: Case Analysis Manual for Instructors
,






The Omega Aero-Space Corporation is a multi-divisional
organization with divisions through the Western and Southern States.
Each division is autonomous within the total organization and is based
on the product orientation of organization design.
Omega Aero-Space Corporation has four primary divisions:
space, aircraft, weapons systems, and commercial products. In turn,
each of these divisions has its own research, engineering, production,
marketing, accounting, and personnel departments.
Corporate policy is administered by the "headquarters" divi-
sion which functions as the policy making and control agency for the
corporation. Each division operates as a separate profit center,
accountable to the Corporate President and Board of Directors.
The case study deals with two departments within the Weapons
Systems Division, Management Analysis, and Data Processing. Both
departments are concerned with the analysis, design, and implementation
of management systems. The objective of a management system is to
direct a set of activities toward achieving improved control of opera-
tions, resulting in improved profitability. To satisfy these goals,
the Management Systems Department has been making extensive use of
computer based systems to provide a quick response in the manipulation
of large amounts of data and to improve the effectiveness of the
functional departments (clients).
The Management Analysis Department and the Data Processing
Department have the responsibility to design and implement the most
efficient management systems. Management' Analysis reported to the
Vice President of Administration, while Data Processing was under the
direction of the Chief Financial Officer (Controller) for the division.
In turn, both of these executives reported to the President of the
division who reported to the Corporate President and the Board of
Directors
.
Through executive direction or by formal request, operations
or management problems would be brought to the Management Analysis
Department. The Director of Management Analysis would assign the
project to the appropriate manager in his department for scheduling
and team appointment. The study approach by the team consisted of the
analysis of the problem, the evaluation of alternatives, and the pro-
posal of the optimum solution. If the client accepted the solution,
and the solution was for a computer based management system, it would
be turned over to the Data Processing Department for computer design,
programming, implementation, operation, and maintenance responsibility.
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The profitability of the Weapons Systems Division was based
on its ability to obtain military contracts for study, design and
production of weapons systems. Contracts were awarded on the basis of
competitive bids. Bid preparation was a complex process performed by
a separate organization in the division known as the Estimating Staff,
which reported directly to the Division President. Bids were based on
data collected from the various departments.
II . Symptoms
The first apparent symptom is the fact that the Weapons
Systems Division was losing an unacceptable number of bids, resulting
in a loss of profit for the division. The Estimating Staff could not
get bids out in time nor could they effectively establish accurate
estimating costs in the time allotted.
The second symptom was that the Data Processing Department
was unable to implement the proposals for the new estimating system as
proposed by the Management Analysis staff. No word had been heard
from Data Processing until the monthly staff meeting held by the
President, when he inquired as to the whereabouts of the progress
report for the implementation of the new computer based system.
The third symptom is that the Controller, who had been
instructed to have the Director of Data Processing prepare a monthly
progress report to both himself and the Division President, did not take
the initiative to check with the Director of Data Processing, when the
report was not submitted, until asked to do so by the Division President
This symptom indicates that there is perhaps a lack of communication
between the Controller and the Director of Data Processing. As becomes
apparent later in the case, the Director tried to get more information
on the new system from the Management Analysis Department who designed
it, but had little success. Furthermore, the Controller, who was
responsible for the Data Processing Department, failed to determine
why he had received no progress report. This symptom also suggests
that there is a lack of communication within the department itself.
A fourth symptom is that meetings had to be scheduled between
the Management Analysis Department and Data Processing to work out
solutions to the problems that were keeping the new management system
from being implemented. The fact that meetings had to be arranged
between the two departments is an indication that there was little if
any communication between these departments.
A fifth symptom is that these scheduled meetings were finally
cancelled resulting in a complete break in communication between the
two departments. This action was taken by the Controller and Director
of Data Processing. A separate meeting with the Division President
was held where both the Director and Controller outlined their percep-
tions of the present conflict to the President.
The final symptom in the case is that the two departments
were apparently at such extreme opposites, that outside consultants
had to be retained to resolve the problem. After having consulted the
Director of Management Analysis, it became evident to the President
that no amount of meetings held between the departments would now solve
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the problems. It>/as no longer a problem of implementing a new manage-
ment system, butr^ather a complete breakdown of the two organizations.
III. Causes
The division was in a profit decline because the present pro-
cedure of estimating was cumbersome and time consuming. In addition,
the costs that were estimated for materials, labor, and overhead were .
not based on present costs. The aero-space industry is a dynamic and
growing industry. New innovations are continually being developed,
especially in the Weapons Systems field. Therefore, it was essential
that valid and current estimating costs be available. If not automated,
the process of estimating is quite time consuming and with the fluctua-
tions in the cost variables, it is apparent that the costs will be
inaccurate in relation to actual expenditures. As a result, the Weapons
Systems Division was losing bids to competitors who had more realistic
cost estimates.
The Data Processing Department could not implement the proposed
management system because the design of the system was considered
impractical by the staff in Data Processing. In developing the new
system, the Management Analysis Team did not take all of tl^ie variables
within the organization into consideration, such as, the technical
problems associated with the design, programming, and operational
implementation of the system, nor did they consider the present work
load in Data Processing. The proposals given also did not take into
consideration the aspect of familiarity with the new proposed computer
language.
The lack of communication between the two departments could
be attributed to the Controller, for when the Management Analysis staff
was established, the Controller felt that it should be established as
part of his department and sent letters to several executives suggesting
this arrangement. However, Management Analysis was made a separate
department. It could be argued that he deliberately caused the problem
with the progress report (in terms of the President) to illustrate that
Management Analysis should be placed under his control. The very fact
that the Controller felt that he should have charge of Management
Analysis, suggests that there would be problems in communication at
the staff level between the two departmerlts
.
Because of personal implications and the fact that Data
Processing was not consulted in the development and design of the
proposed computer based management system, both departments were forced
to have meetings to attempt to solve the problems in the design, pro-
gramming and scheduling of the system. The cancellation of these
meetings indicates that both departments were unable to reach any
consensus in the solving of their problems. This can be attributed
to the absence of formal communication between the two departments
until the proposed system was to be implemented. Both departments,
as noted previously, acted as autonomous organizations. There seemed
to be no coordination. Also there were accusations of incompetency
coming from Management Analysis resulting in negative reactions by the
members of both organizations and finally a general disagreement as
to who has authority over whom. All of these problems appear to have
their basis in a "power struggle" between the Controller and the




The alternatives to solve the problems of internal strife
between the Management Analysis Department and Data Processing Depart-
ment are as follows:
1. Leave things as they are.
2. Leave the organization structure as it is but assign new directors.
3. Combine Management Analysis with Data Processing or vice versa.
4. Combine one department with the other and restaff the Controller
and Director positions.
5. Redesign the organization structure so that Management Analysis
and Data Processing are combined into a centralized organization
under a new head, and restaff the managerial positions.
Leaving things as they are has a low probability of solving
the problems. The key members in the organization could be asked to
participate in a T-Group to make them more aware of the needs of the
members in both organizations. But this is not a plausible solution.
Both groups are questioning the rights of legitimacy and authority;
therefore, the status quo is not a feasible solution. Sensitivity
training or the redefinition of the organization structure would be
of little value, presumably after a period of time there would once
again be the struggle for power between the Controller and the Director
of Management Analysis. This power struggle is an attempt to fulfill
personal goals and not those of the organization.
Leaving the organizational structure as it is but appointing
a new Controller and a new Director of Management Analysis would remove
the problem of having personal goals interfere with those of the
organization. The questions that still remain, however, are the issue
of who has "control" over whom and also at what point if any should
Data Processing be brought into the study of a management system:
after the study is completed and accepted or during the study.
Combining one department with the other would address the
question of control and authority but this would probably only increase
the struggle for personal power between both key members; the Controller
and the Director.
Combining one department with the other and restaffing the
Controller and Director positions would alleviate the question as to
who tells whom what to do. With new staff members, the organization
may redefine its goals to correspond to those of the entire organiza-
tion, but it will probably fail when assigned an analysis problem if
each department is kept as a separate entity.
The last alternative solution is considered the optimum solution,




The optimum solution is a combination of several of the alter-
natives discussed above. Both Management Analysis and Data Processing
should be reorganized as a new department; but still making use of
existing groups within both present departments. By combining both
departments, the affect would be to centralize all of the activities
involved in the analysis, design, development, and operation of a
management system.
Centralization of a management system is based on the principle
of functional specialization. Therefore, everyone concerned with
the analysis and operation of a management system is placed within that
system. Where an organization is separated into different functional
divisions, it is difficult to achieve cooperation spontaneously, because
each unit is established as a complete entity and works in terms of its
own system rather than in terms of the organization as a whole. Each
unit tends to "suboptimize" and finds ways to protect itself from the
encroachment by others. The result is conflict which develops at all
levels. Also, administrators may become so involved in resolving real
or imagined incompatibilities between systems that they tend to negate
the objectives of the total system. By combining the two departments
as a new organization, that new organization would be able to react
guickly and collectively in decisions involving the analysis of manage-
ment systems. The new department should use a project management
approach, that is, no rigid boundaries and analysis teams including all
related activities within the scope of analysis. These teams would, in
effect, work as integrated units. All individuals necessary to do a
specific job would report to the head of each project team who would
be able to interact with everyone directly associated with the achieve-
ment of the project's objective. A coordinator of projects is needed
to coordinate the information, research knowledge, and operation of
each team, thereby increasing the overall efficiency of the project
approach
.
The assignment of a new director from outside the division
(from the corporate office) should eliminate most of the conflicts in
personal interests which were present.
In summary, the optimum solution is to centralize the two
present departments as a new department and appoint a new director for
the new department. In addition, the other key positions in the new
organization should be restaffed by members from within the organiza-








The Manpower Office is a special branch of the Manpower Divi-
sion of the Federal Government and is a typical government bureaucratic
organization. See Addendum A.
Authority
Mr. Nelson draws his authority from the central office and
reports to the head of the central office. Non-scheduled or surprise
visits are made by the central office to check on the work and progress
of Mr. Nelson.
Mr. Peron, after replacing Mr. Nelson, received his authority
from the same source as does Mr. Nelson.
The employees in the branch office report directly to Mr. Nelson.
Duties and Responsibilities
Mr. Nelson — manager of the Manpower office was appointed in
the Spring of 1968. He had previous experience in the central office
since 1950 as a counsellor and subsequently advanced to division head
by 1967 at age 50. He also had experience in special committees to
solve problems of major interest arising in any of the departments
within the division. His former employment record indicated that he
had been an assistant personnel manager for a large manufacturing firm.
Mr. Peron, assistant division head, started as a trainee
after graduation from university. He has worked in almost every
department to get an overall view of the operation of the division.
He appears to be helpful to others and has developed new ideas for
improvement in the organization. In 1967 he was also appointed to the
special committee.
Employees
The staff of the special branch consists of young university
students who work in this branch during the summer months. Their main
job is to interview high school students for prospective jobs, canvass
the neighborhood to find out how many jobs may be open to students,
screen applicants and make referrals to employers. They maintain a
file on each student and keep a report on the students' progress.




The objective of the branch office is find summer jobs for
high school students.
Procedures
There are certain established procedures for the staff in the
branch. During May and June, staff would canvass the city to contact
prospective employers for high school students. Other staff would
remain in the office to interview students who "walked in" looking for
jobs. A system was set up for student referrals and also for calling
employers who indicated that they would employ students.
B. Human Resources
Technology or Administrative Qualifications
Mr. Nelson's education is now known, but he has many years of
experience in the Manpower division. There is no data on his performance
as an assistant personnel manager with the manufacturing company.
The job of manager of the special branch calls for experience
in this type of work. The person selected is usually a division head
or an assistant division head. The job of branch manager is also a
"stepping stone" to better jobs within the division.
Mr. Peron has a degree in psychology and appears to be well
qualified on paper for the job of counsellor and later as division head.
Interaction
The case shows that interaction between Mr. Nelson and his
subordinates was high during the first weeks of the operation and seemed
to be quite amicable, however, the interaction was one-way from super-
visor to subordinate. Subordinates were not allowed to question the
supervisor's decisions or to bring forth new ideas for improvement. As
work progressed and work load increased, interaction between supervisor
and employees became hostile and aggressive.
Leadership
Mr. Nelson is an authoritarian type of leader. He states
what he expects of the students and tells them that he is boss and they
must follow his instructions to the letter. Rules must be strictly
adhered to, such as coffee breaks, where only 15 minutes are allowed
and personnel must finish what they are doing before going on breaks.
Work must commence on the hour and finish on the hour. Procedures for
work must be adhered to and there must be no deviation from the establish-
ed pattern. He does not like students discussing problems with one
another, but they must go directly to him. He interrupts staff members
while they are dealing with the public and uses "name calling" when they
make errors. He does not give his staff a chance to explain themselves
when they make mistakes nor does he accept their position and has used
dismissal in one instance. After reprimand by his superior, he with-
draws to his private office.
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Mr. Peron seems to be friendly/ outgoing and dynamic. He asks
employees for their opinions and works in a cooperative manner with
them. He appears to alleviate anxiety and work continues without any
apparent problems after his arrival in the branch office.
Attitudes
Mr. Nelson is very overt in showing his attitude toward
university workers. He calls them long-haired hippies and tells them
they should get their hair cut when some of them misunderstand orders.
He wants to portray a good picture of an efficient government operation
and pushes his staff to work harder by intimidating them. He blames
them for his poor performance when he receives the reprimand.
Sentiments
Before Mr. Nelson took over the responsibility of the branch
office, he indicated that he did not want to work with a bunch of long-
haired, vulgar hippies and did not know why the directors had to pick
him for the job. He also feels that the employees are paid to work
and not to think. Mr. Nelson's initial reaction carried on in his
subsequent relationship with his subordinates.
The staff felt that too much pressure was being placed on
them by Mr. Nelson and they were not going to continue to work for a
dictator or a slave driver.
II. Symptoms
The symptoms are as follows
:
1. high turnover of personnel in the branch office;
2. low morale;
3. stress is very high;
4. minimum differentiation between head of branch office and director
of the central office;
5. low integration between branch office and central office;




1. Lack of coordination between the central office and the branch
office. As Miller (1967) points out, "failure to differentiate
on the appropriate basis will create stress in relationships,
because the natural groupings inherent in the structure of task
performance will run counter to the groupings dictated by the
formal organization." The branch office is allowed to operate
without control from the central office. The central office uses
surprise visits to check performance as if to "catch" the branch
director off guard, causing increased anxiety and stress.
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2. There is an inflexible, rigid work procedure. The staff cannot
modify or deviate from the applied schedule.
3. Leadership style causes poor communication, low morale, stress, and
high turnover of personnel. However, as will be noted in item 4
below, leadership style is caused by conflict. Wilson (1968-69)
points out that participative and bureaucratic management practices
are strongly related with cooperative and opportunistic adaptations
respectively. In the bureaucratic leadership style, high privilege
units subordinates are likely to have opportunistic-adaptations but
as time goes on a shift results towards alienation.
Evidence presented by Cioffi (1958) showed the relationship
between leadership style and productivity, absenteeism, and turnover.
Productivity is higher when the supervisor has a certain style of
leadership. Men work harder when supervised in certain ways indicat-
ing that style of leadership is the cause of output difference. Labor
turnover was not related to supervisor dimensions or to size of groups.
Leadership style helps the subordinate in his role obligations and
style of leadership is more significant in directing supervision than
it has in hierarchial influence. Democratic leadership enhances closer
interaction between supervisor and subordinates leading to higher out-
puts and more cohesion in organisations.
Research by Oaklander and Fleishman (1963) may be related to
leadership style. This study points out how patterns of leadership are
related to stress. Consistent results in this study show consideration
emphasized by the supervisor. Higher consideration is related to lower
intra-unit stress. In no case was the amount of consideration related
to inter-unit stress.
With respect to leadership and perception of communication
between superiors and subordinates, Webber (1980) indicated in his
research findings that initiators perceive more verbal communication
than receivers for upward and downward channels. Managers with active,
high initiative would tend to perceive and be perceived differently
than a manager with more passive, inactive lower initiative.
4. The special branch is structured on place and function departmenta-
tion. Although the director of the special branch reports to the
branch director, the division chief within the branch supervises
the special branch (directors' representative). The position of
divisions chief is equivalent to the special branch director so
the positions are lateral. This creates conflict within the organi-
zation. The special branch director's job, which is equivalent to
division chief, is a stepping stone to promotion whereas the central
division chiefs' jobs are not. A conflict of individual goals
versus organizational goals may thus cause an attitude change in
leadership to one of authoritarian and strict control. The special
branch director wants to achieve the organizational goals at the
same time as achieving his goal of promotion.
5. The division chiefs of the branch office have excessive authority
over the branch office which is causing stress for the special
branch director. The special branch director is trying to maintain
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power and authority that he does not have and he is doing it by use
of force. His position is seen by the employees as just another cog
in the machine. His position holds no power and no respect but his
imposition of power upon the employees causes anxiety and low morale,
IV. Alternative Solutions
1. Transfer Mr. Nelson out of the branch office and replace him with
Mr. Peron.
2. Change the selection system of the division so that a thorough
screening and interviewing process takes place to ensure a higher
probability of selecting better management staff.
3. Develop closer liaison between the branch office and the central
office so a higher degree of differentiation will develop, in that
both departments will not create cognitive dissonance. This would
also increase the quality of collaboration between departments and
will achieve a higher degree of unity of effort by the environment.
4. Dismiss Mr. Nelson because it does little good to send him back to
another top-level job in the main office with his present attitude
and where he can now impose his new authority upon the branch
office to get even.
5. Attempt to change the attitude of Mr. Nelson by interpersonal
training (T-group, group therapy, etc.).
6. Reorganize by incorporating the special branch into the branch
office.
V. Optimum Solution
There is little opportunity to change the supervisor's
attitude in his present job as special branch head because of the time
factor and the present organization structure. There was only one
month left in the operation of the special branch before it closed down
for the winter. The best interim recourse in this type of situation is
to remove him by transferring him to the branch office and bring in an
interim manager like Mr. Feron. There is an obligation by management
to alleviate stress and anxiety and try to make the office a cohesive
unit again, and someone like Mr. Peron has the personality to do this.
In preparing for the following year, a reorganization of the branch
office should be instigated to incorporate the Student Manpower Office
as indicated in the proposed chart in Addendum B. This would place all
of the division chiefs on a horizontal level with the same power and
authority reporting directly to the branch director. The method of
promotion would then be on merit and any one of the division chief's
jobs can qualify for the "stepping stone" for promotion. Inspection of
the Student Manpower Office would be the responsibility of the branch
director. A reorganization of this type would minimize the conflict
of goals between the individual and the organization and would reduce
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t±e stress on the division chiefs. Mr. Nelson's attitude of leader-
ship cannot be changed easily by group dynamics, if it can be changed
at all, so it does little good to place him in such a program. His
attitude could be modified over time and perhaps if he is given an
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